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STRAIGHTWASHING THE CENSUS 
KYLE C. VELTE* 
Abstract: This Article examines the “straightwashing” of the census through the 
“Identity Undercount”—the failure of the state to collect sexual orientation and 
gender identity (SOGI) population data in government surveys such as the Cen-
sus. The Identity Undercount, while counting the literal bodies of LGBT people, 
erases their lived identity. For many in the LGBT population, their lived identity 
and reality is one of poverty and powerlessness, a reality contrary to the widely 
accepted narrative that the LGBT population is more affluent and powerful than 
the rest of the population. Because federal and state governments rely on popula-
tion data to drive policy decisions about the allocation of $675 billion in federal 
funds, most of which is apportioned to anti-poverty programs, the straightwash-
ing of government data does real harm to LGBT people in poverty. If policymak-
ers cannot see the problems, they cannot craft meaningful policy solutions or 
modify existing policies to meet the needs of the LGBT population. Because data 
are tied to resource allocation, the Identity Undercount results in resource deserts 
where LGBT people do not get critical and necessary services. The Article argues 
that the government should collect SOGI population data and that the near-
complete failure to do so makes the state an active participant in creating and 
sustaining institutionalized poverty for LGBT people. 
INTRODUCTION 
“What’s measured is what matters when it comes to public policy.”1 
On March 23, 2016, in a hastily-convened special session lasting only 
twelve hours and “rife with procedural irregularities,”2 the North Carolina leg-
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 1 Rowan Walrath, Trump’s War on Data Could Quietly Erase LGBT Crime Victims, MOTHER 
JONES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/04/trumps-war-on-data-
could-quietly-erase-lgbt-crime-victims/ [https://perma.cc/H37L-EURU] (quoting Eliza Byard, execu-
tive director of the Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network). 
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islature passed the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, more commonly 
known as HB 2.3 Passed in response to a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) antidiscrimination ordinance enacted by the City of Char-
lotte, HB 2 repealed all local ordinances throughout the state, prohibited the 
passage of such protections in the future, and required transgender people to 
use public restrooms based on sex assigned at birth rather than gender identi-
ty.4 North Carolina was not an outlier as several other state legislatures intro-
duced over two-hundred anti-LGBT laws in 2016.5 
Pro-equality organizations immediately filed a lawsuit to challenge HB 
2.6 One issue that these organizations faced was that they could not allege with 
certainty in their complaint the number of LGBT people living in North Caro-
lina. In the words of one advocate: “It’s not OK that I can’t tell you exactly 
how many LGBT people there are in North Carolina.”7 When civil rights at-
torneys challenge laws that discriminate against LGBT people, knowing the 
number of LGBT people impacted by the law is important to the strength of 
the legal claims and to the power of the story told by the litigation. 
The number of LGBT people in North Carolina and, indeed, the number 
of LGBT people in the United States as a whole is not known with certainty 
because the federal government does not collect comprehensive data on sexual 
orientation or gender identity in the Census or any other major government 
survey. Such data are necessary not only to fight back against the recent wave of 
anti-LGBT bills, but as a matter of economic justice for the LGBT community. 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-236). 
 3 See generally Kyle C. Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires with the First Amendment: Religious 
Freedom, the Anti-LGBT Right, and Interest Convergence Theory, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2017) 
(describing HB 2’s history and impact). 
 4 Id. at 1146–47; see also Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C–47 
(2016), repealed by An Act to Reset S.L. 2016-3 (H.B. 142), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4. 
 5 See generally Kriston Capps, Mapping the Rise of Anti-LGBT Legislation on the First Anniver-
sary of Nationwide Marriage Equality, CITYLAB (June 24, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/
2016/06/mapping-the-rise-of-anti-lgbt-legislation-on-the-first-anniversary-of-nationwide-marriage-
equality/488642/ [https://perma.cc/2FCD-7WSL] (noting that “in 2016 alone, state legislatures have 
introduced more than 200 anti-LGBT bills in 34 different states”). 
 6 See Advocacy Groups File Federal Lawsuit Challenging North Carolina’s Sweeping Anti-LGBT 
Law, ACLU (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/advocacy-groups-file-federal-lawsuit-
challenging-north-carolinas-sweeping-anti-lgbt-law [https://perma.cc/Z8S3-LCP3]; see also Com-
plaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7 See generally Samantha Allen, Why We Need an LGBT Census, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-we-need-an-lgbt-Census [https://perma.cc/A4TG-FHVS] (quot-
ing Laura Durso, a senior director at the Center for American Progress, who stated “[i]t really kills me 
that we’re having these consequential policy debates and I can’t put a number on how many people 
are affected”). 
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The U.S. government uses data collected through surveys such as the U.S. 
Census and the American Community Survey (ACS) to drive policy decisions 
concerning the allocation of over $675 billion in federal spending, most of 
which is apportioned to anti-poverty programs. It uses this data to assess the 
effectiveness of anti-poverty programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Fami-
lies, Medicaid, and food stamps, including their effectiveness with respect to 
different demographic groups including race, ethnicity, and gender. But the 
data neither track these programs nor make policy decisions based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity (SOGI), two other important demographics, 
because such data are largely absent from major government surveys.8 
Many scholars have written about the differential undercount—a white-
washing of the Census by which African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and 
Asian Americans have not been counted at all.9 This Article examines what I 
call the “Identity Undercount”—the failure of the state to collect SOGI data. It 
is a “straightwashing” of the Census. In contrast to the differential undercount, 
                                                                                                                           
 8 The 2020 U.S. Census will permit cohabitating same-sex couples to choose between “same-sex 
husband/wife/spouse” or “same-sex unmarried partner.” While this is a positive change, it leaves out 
single LGBT people, LGBT people who are in non-cohabitating relationships, and bisexual people in 
different-sex relationships. See Hansi Lo Wang, 2020 Census Will Ask About Same-Sex Relationships, 
NPR (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/30/598192154/2020-Census-will-ask-about-same-
sex-relationships [https://perma.cc/C92B-CGP9].  
 9 See, e.g., Manav Bhatnagar, Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and the Myth of Self-
Classification, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 85, 103 (2007) (“The mere existence of racial categories has 
drawn criticism from the anti-classification camp, which alleges that continued racial data collection 
stunts the development towards a race-blind society. There is also an anti-subordination argument to 
be made, since the ambiguous boundaries of the current racial categories, complicated by logistical 
difficulties in conducting the census, lead to a differential undercount that disproportionately affects 
minority groups.”); Molly Danahy & Danielle Lang, Distortion in the Census: America’s Oldest Ger-
rymander?, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1065, 1066–67 (2019) (“Decade after decade, the census dispropor-
tionately undercounts minority communities. This bias in the results is termed the ‘differential under-
count.’ Moreover, the census also miscounts incarcerated individuals in their prison cells rather than 
their home communities. This practice also disproportionately impacts minority representation. De-
spite these representational harms, there has been little to no remedy for that undercounting and mis-
counting in the redistricting context.”) (footnotes omitted); Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: 
Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L. REV. 899, 903 (2001) (“Because [the differen-
tial undercount] represents a particular bias in the data as opposed to an inaccuracy randomly distrib-
uted throughout the population, the differential rather than net undercount preoccupies those con-
cerned about the census’s effect on equal representation for minorities.”) (footnote omitted); Benjamin 
J. Razi, Census Politics Revisited: What to Do When the Government Can’t Count?, 48 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1101, 1109–10 (1999) (“The differential undercount problem is more troubling than the under-
count of the population as a whole because the consistent undercounting of minority groups threatens 
to make hollow the most basic promises of our democracy. . . . In addition, the differential undercount 
causes inequities that are more tangible as well. These problems include the under-representation of 
minority communities in Congress and in state legislatures, and the inequitable distribution of funds 
under government programs to minority communities.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Definitions, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/coverage_measurement/definitions/ [https://perma.cc/
S63N-6VGE]. 
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which fails to count the literal bodies of people of color, the Identity Under-
count, while counting the literal bodies of LGBT people, erases their lived 
identity. Policymakers ignore the needs of the LGBT community, particularly 
the needs of LGBT people in poverty, because the Identity Undercount renders 
these needs invisible.10 
The Trump Administration’s recent decision to reject proposed SOGI 
questions from the 2020 Census and the ACS—which is a component of the 
Census—received widespread attention in the press and in social media.11 
Many critics of this decision focused on the symbolic effect of the decision—
when one is not counted as a matter of data, one does not count as a matter of 
morality or humanity. While visibility is important for such symbolic reasons, 
it is also important as a matter of policy, power, and economic justice. 
There is a commonly accepted narrative that the LGBT community is 
more affluent than the rest of the population. Contrary to that narrative, how-
ever, data suggests that LGBT people live in poverty at rates disproportionate 
to the non-LGBT population.12 Moreover, LGBT people fare far more poorly 
than their non-LGBT counterparts on other measures including health out-
comes,13 homelessness,14 employment discrimination,15 and truancy for LGBT 
                                                                                                                           
 10 This Article adds to the scholarly work done by other scholars, who have made the important 
point about the perils of LGBT erasure in other contexts. See generally Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus 
Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389 (2017) (noting that the adherence to a gender binary erases 
gender non-binary people and explaining the harms of that erasure); Nancy J. Knauer, “Gen Silent”: 
Advocating for LGBT Elders, 19 ELDER L.J. 289 (2012) (discussing the erasure of elders’ LGBT past 
and identity in the context of incapacity and guardianship); Nancy C. Marcus, Bridging Bisexual 
Erasure in LGBT-Rights Discourse and Litigation, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 315–32 (2015) 
(discussing the consequences of bisexual erasure in litigation and legal discourse); Cara E. Tromba-
dore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action in a Context Disproportionately 
Threatening Women of Color, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 153, 168 (2016) (discussing the 
consequences of erasure of LGBT and other marginalized communities from discourse about police 
misconduct); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
201, 209–16 (2012) (examining erasure as a tool of anti-LGBT subordination); Jordan Blair Woods, 
LGBT Identity and Crime, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 667 (2017) (describing the limited data on LGBT peo-
ple in the criminal justice system and its consequences); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of 
Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 459 (2000) (explaining why bisexuality as a category has 
been erased in American political and legal discourse). 
 11 See, e.g., Mary Emily O’Hara, LGBTQ Americans Won’t Be Counted in 2020 U.S. Census 
After All, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/lgbtq-americans-
won-t-be-counted-2020-u-s-Census-n739911[https://perma.cc/532R-HBPT]; Hansi Lo Wang, Trump 
Officials ‘Did Not Want’ Census Survey to Ask About Sexual Orientation, NPR (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/20/649752485/trump-officials-did-not-want-Census-survey-to-ask-
about-sexual-orientation [https://perma.cc/6MZC-S5KN]. 
 12 See M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., NEW PATTERNS OF POVERTY IN THE LESBI-
AN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY 8 (2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf. 
 13 See generally Travis Franklin Chance, “Going to Pieces” Over LGBT Health Care Disparities: 
How an Amended Affordable Care Act Could Cure the Discrimination That Ails the LGBT Communi-
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students because of harassment and bullying in schools.16 LGBT people also are 
victims of hate crimes at higher rates than their non-LGBT counterparts. 17 Many 
of these disparities lead to economic insecurity and oftentimes to poverty.  
Because federal and state governments rely on survey data to inform a 
multitude of policy and programmatic decisions, the straightwashing of gov-
ernment survey data through the Identity Undercount does real harm to LGBT 
people. These harms include the denial of statutory civil rights protections, the 
dilution of political power, and the creation of maintenance of poverty in the 
LGBT community. Because there is a direct connection between the denial of 
civil rights and political power on the one hand and economic insecurity and 
poverty on the other, erasing LGBT identity from the Census leaves policy-
makers blind to the connected structural problems unique to the LGBT com-
munity. Unaware of these intersecting problems, policymakers cannot come up 
with meaningful solutions nor modify existing policies to meet the needs of the 
LGBT community. The lack of meaningful, pointed policies—such as job-
training and placement programs for transgender workers, the passage of a 
federal LGBT employment antidiscrimination statute, greater access to cultur-
ally competent public health resources, and LGBT-specific housing pro-
grams—reveals an incomplete and inaccurate Census system and one that 
makes the state an active participant in the economic marginalization of LGBT 
people. 
This Article addresses the connection between government data collection 
and LGBT poverty and power. It has three goals: (1) expose the lack of SOGI 
population data collection in government surveys and explain its significance 
to LGBT people; (2) add to existing scholarship debunking the persistent myth 
                                                                                                                           
ty, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375, 383–86 (2013) (describing anti-LGBT discrimination in 
healthcare and its impact on health outcomes). 
 14 See, e.g., Mollie Reilly, The Criminal Justice System Disproportionately Targets LGBT People, 
Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lgbt-criminal-
justice-system_us_56ce3108e4b03260bf756d5c [https://perma.cc/CX9E-VP7K] (stating that LGBT 
people are “at a higher risk of becoming homeless or turning to criminal activity”). 
 15 See generally NPR, DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF LGBTQ 
AMERICANS, at 2 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA] https://www.npr.org/
documents/2017/nov/npr-discrimination-lgbtq-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NUY-SVNH] (describing 
survey results finding 59% of LGBTQ people believe they have fewer employment opportunities 
because of their SOGI and finding that 50% of LGBTQ people believe they are paid less than non-
LGBTQ employees). 
 16 See generally Hannah Hicks, Note, It’s All in the Family: LGBT Youth Homelessness and Fam-
ily Conflict Intervention, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 311, 320 (2016) (“LGBT youth are particularly 
vulnerable in [juvenile] proceedings because of their high rates of family conflict and truancy, which 
often stems from discrimination or bullying at school.”). 
 17 See generally Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 13–14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111). 
2020] Straightwashing the Census 75 
of LGBT wealth and power; and (3) add to existing scholarship that exposes 
government population data collection as a tool used by the state to create 
identity, as well as a “method of population management that distributes life 
chances.”18 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
“why” and “how” of government data collection.19 Part II makes the case for 
the Identity Undercount.20 Part III debunks the widely-held belief that LGBT 
Americans are overwhelmingly wealthy and politically powerful.21 Part IV 
describes the harms of the Identity Undercount.22 Part V addresses common 
critiques to government data collection and argues that the government should 
begin collecting SOGI data on all surveys while offering possible avenues to 
force such collection.23 The Article concludes with a description of future work 
on this issue and notes that where data are tied to resource allocation, the con-
tinued deliberate failure to collect SOGI data makes the state an active partici-
pant in creating and sustaining institutionalized poverty for LGBT people. 
I. THE HOW AND WHY OF GOVERNMENT POPULATION DATA COLLECTION 
This Part provides an overview of why the government collects data and 
how it goes about collecting that data. Section A discusses the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Census Clause and the government surveys utilized to collect this infor-
mation.24 Section B discusses additional reasons for the government to collect 
census data including for legal and policy reasons.25 Section C discusses the 
specific population data the Census and the ACS collect, how they have ex-
cluded certain groups, and how it has led to discrimination particularly in the 
areas of race, sex, and ethnicity.26 These summaries set up and frame Parts II 
through IV, which describe the pervasive poverty in the LGBT population and 
the Identity Undercount that makes the government an active participant in the 
creation and continuation of that poverty. 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 747 (2007). 
 19 See infra notes 28–93 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 94–143 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 144–253 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 260–317 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 320–387 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 27–59 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 71–93 and accompanying text. 
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A. How the Government Collects Data: The Census and the  
American Community Survey27 
The Census Clause of the U.S. Constitution directs that an “actual Enu-
meration” of the U.S. population “shall be made” every ten years.28 Two pur-
poses were originally served by this provision: apportionment of congressional 
representatives and levying taxes.29 Tying taxation to population incentivized 
states to make accurate population reports because overstating population, 
which would benefit states in congressional apportionment, meant higher tax-
es.30 The taxing purpose of the Census Clause, however, became moot in 1916 
with the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment.31 As a result, apportionment of 
congressional representatives today is the only express constitutional mandate 
fulfilled by the Census. 
During its early years, the Census was administered in an ad hoc manner, 
either by executive order or through the enactment of legislation.32 The admin-
istration of the Census was centralized in 1902, when Congress passed the 
Permanent Census Act, establishing the Census Office.33 In 1954, Congress 
passed a second piece of legislation relating to the Census, Title 13 of the U.S. 
Code, which codified the administrative particulars for executing the Census.34 
                                                                                                                           
 27 There are a number of other significant government surveys that collect a myriad of data. Ex-
amples include the American Housing survey, which gathers data concerning the nation’s housing 
inventory, the National Crime Victimization Survey, which tracks the types and frequency of crimes 
and the demographics of its victims, and the Current Population Survey (CPS), which collects labor 
and employment data, including demographic information of respondents in and out of the workforce. 
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, https://factfinder.Census.gov/faces/nav/
jsf/pages/programs.xhtml?program=ahs [https://perma.cc/858s-WAZQ]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&
iid=245 [https://perma.cc/LR9D-NNTY]; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, https://www.bls.gov/cps [https://perma.cc/GUR9-CB5B]. 
This Article focuses on the Census and the ACS because they are the largest government surveys to 
collect population data and thus the most impactful concerning the distribution of federal funds, which 
often is population-based. The Article discusses other government surveys where relevant to its thesis 
and arguments. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Shane T. Stansbury, Note, Making Sense of the Census: The Decennial Census Debate and Its 
Meaning for America’s Ethnic and Racial Minorities, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 406–07 
(2000). 
 31 Id. at 407; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the “power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration”). 
 32 See Carrie Pixler, Note, Setting the Boundaries of the Census Clause: Normative and Legal 
Concerns Regarding the American Community Survey, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1097, 1100 
(2010). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1100–01. 
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Congress is tasked with conducting the Census each decade “in such Manner 
as they shall by law direct.”35 Through passage of Title 13, Congress delegated 
this responsibility to the Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau.36 The 
President appoints the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Census 
Bureau, subject to the Senate’s advice and consent.37 The task of enumeration 
consists of three parts: “count each person whose usual residence is in the 
United States; count that person only once; and count him or her at the right 
location, where the person lives all or most of the time.”38 
From 1940 through 2000, the Census was comprised of two parts—the 
short form and the long form.39 The short form collected basic demographic 
data such as “age, sex, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic or non-Hispanic) of each 
person in a household.”40 The long form, which was sent to a sampling of 
homes, asked more detailed questions regarding socioeconomic status and 
housing.41 The government gathered these data to inform policy decisions for a 
number of legislative and program purposes.42 Based on privacy concerns 
about the questions that arguably fell outside the scope of the constitutionally 
required enumeration mandate for the Census, beginning with the 2010 Cen-
sus, the long form was dropped and only the short form was distributed.43 
The ACS stepped in to replace the long form and was uncoupled from the 
short form Census.44 This permitted the Census Bureau to concentrate its de-
                                                                                                                           
 35 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
 36 See, e.g., Pixler, supra note 32, at 1100–01; Stansbury, supra note 30, at 406. 
 37 JENNIFER D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40551, THE 2010 DECENNIAL CENSUS: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (2011). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. During this period, and up until 2003, sodomy laws were constitutional. See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy to violate the Due Process 
clause of the Constitution and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558). As such, LGBT-focused data collected during this time centered on tracking 
sodomy prosecutions and sexual psychopath prosecutions. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hard-
wick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construc-
tion of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy 1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007 
(1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946–1961, 
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703 (1997); Woods, supra note 10. This legacy of pre-Lawrence prosecutions 
is an important historical backdrop to the privacy and confidentiality concerns that some have ex-
pressed in contesting the collection of data by the government. See discussion infra Part V, Section B. 
 40 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 3. 
 41 The long form was sent to roughly one in six households. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
SUBJECTS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2017) [hereinafter 
CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED], https://www2.Census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/
operations/planned-subjects-2020-acs.pdf (providing background to the Census and the ACS and 
discussing plans for the information to be collected for the 2020 Census); Pixler, supra note 32, at 
1103 (discussing the Census and its relationship to policy objectives).  
 42 See WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 3. 
 43 Id.; see also Pixler, supra note 32, at 1098. 
 44 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 3; see also Pixler, supra note 32, at 1098. 
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cennial Census effort on the constitutional requirement of enumeration while 
also providing, via the ACS, more current and comprehensive information than 
any prior Census.45 Instead of being coupled with the Census, the ACS is sent 
to different segments of the American population on a monthly basis, thus gen-
erating timely and continuous data to the government.46 The ACS is the most 
significant survey after the short form Census. The nationwide, continuous 
ACS “provide[s] communities with reliable and timely demographic, social, 
economic, and housing data for the nation, states, congressional districts, coun-
ties, places, and other localities every year.”47 The information obtained from 
the ACS is processed and disseminated to make data-driven decisions at the 
federal, state, and local levels.48 It has an annual sample size of about three 
million addresses across the United States and Puerto Rico and includes both 
housing units and group quarters (e.g., nursing facilities and prisons).49 
The ACS data are issued annually.50 It is mandatory to respond to the 
ACS, even though the information collected by the ACS is outside of the nar-
row mandate of the Constitution’s Census Clause, which only requires enu-
meration—the count of everyone residing in the United States on census day.51 
The content of both the Census and the ACS is reviewed regularly to ensure 
that the federal government requires the data collected.52 To that end, agencies 
provide information to the Census Bureau and U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget outlining their data requirements.53 The Census Bureau uses this in-
formation to evaluate the content being contemplated for the next Census and 
ACS.54 Federal law requires that Congress approves all new questions and all 
questions have some connection with federal funding.55 In other words, there 
must be a programmatic need for particular kinds of data before questions col-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 1. 
 46 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 3. 
 47 DAPHNE LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS: AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS 4 (2011), https://www2.Census.gov/library/publications/2011/acs/acsbr
10-03.pdf. 
 48 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY INFORMATION GUIDE 3 (2017), 
U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.Census.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-surveys/acs/about/ACS_
Information_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT7W-SBH8]. 
 49 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY, 
CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE DESIGN AND SELECTION 1, 15 (2014), https://www2.Census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/methodology/design_and_methodology/acs_design_methodology_ch04_2014.pdf. 
 50 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 1. 
 51 See Pixler, supra note 32, at 1099. 
 52 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 1. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Pixler, supra note 32, at 1107–08. 
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lecting such data will be approved and added to the Census or ACS.56 Notably, 
the ACS is the “only data-gathering effort that collects information from 
enough people to produce comparable data for every geographic area recog-
nized by the Census Bureau.”57 
The 2020 Census will ask questions in seven different categories while 
the 2020 ACS will ask questions in thirty-three different categories.58 The only 
questions in the 2020 Census and ACS that collect some SOGI data are the 
“relationship” questions that have options for “same-sex husband/wife/spouse” 
and “same-sex unmarried partner.”59 As explained below, these questions fail 
to capture data about many within the LGBT community—uncoupled LGBT 
people, polyamorous people, bisexual people in different-sex relationships, and 
transgender and nonbinary people. Thus, the data that are collected are inade-
quate to inform LGBT-rights advocates as they lobby for more expansive 
LGBT civil rights or to inform politicians and policymakers about the real 
needs of the entire LGBT community as they craft laws, policies, and regula-
tions that impact that community. 
B. Why the Government Collects Data 
In addition to fulfilling a constitutional mandate for congressional appor-
tionment, federal and state governments, at every level, use Census data for 
other reasons. Data from the Census and ACS, as well as from other federal 
surveys, are used to influence law and policy. Most importantly, such data are 
used by states to draw legislative voting districts and to make decisions about 
the allocation of government funds.60 The latter purpose—funding decisions, 
particularly those to fund anti-poverty programs—is the focus of this Article. 
Because the United States functions primarily as an administrative state, 
the importance and impact of the government’s use of Census and other survey 
data to make programmatic funding decisions cannot be understated.61 The use 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See NAT’L LGBTQ TASK FORCE, LGBTQ CENSUS ADVOCACY, 1990–2017 (2017) [hereinafter 
LGBTQ CENSUS ADVOCACY], http://www.thetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/LGBTQ-
Census-Advocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z82C-FQJP]. 
 57 CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 1. 
 58 See infra Appendix A. 
 59 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 13. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See generally Brian A. Ellison, Bureaucratic Politics, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Ani-
mals-La Plata Project, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 367, 373 (2009) (stating that “[t]he United States of 
America is largely governed by the administrative state, which includes national, state, and local 
agencies that share jurisdiction over substantive policy arenas”); Marie-Amlie George, Bureaucratic 
Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 94–102 
(2018) (describing the pervasive reach of the administrative reach in the lives of LGBT people and the 
opportunities for resistance within the administrative apparatus); Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic 
Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 291, 296–302 (2012) (describing the rise of 
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of such data to drive dollars to some programs and away from others has a 
broad and deep impact on most Americans.62 Census and ACS data determine 
the annual distribution of more than $675 billion of federal funding that feder-
al, state, and local governments use to fund social safety net and equal oppor-
tunity programs.63 Population-based grant programs are numerous, “ranging 
from Medicaid to highway planning and construction programs.”64 Other pro-
grams funded with Census- and ACS-directed money include “education 
grants, affirmative action programs, community reinvestment and develop-
ment, public health programs, mortgage lending, low-income housing tax cred-
its, voting rights, employment rights, legislative redistricting, government con-
tracting, food stamps, and veteran benefits.”65 A majority of the $675 billion is 
allocated for anti-poverty programming.66 
Census data are also used to evaluate compliance with and to enforce fed-
eral civil rights law, such as the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, 
which prohibit discrimination in employment, credit, and housing.67 Federal 
agencies that use Census data to monitor enforcement of civil rights law in-
clude the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Additionally, federal 
agencies use Census data to make policy decisions. For example, HUD makes 
decisions about the placement of low-income and public housing based on ra-
                                                                                                                           
the modern administrative state and its dominance); Peter Grieser, Note, Administrative Contexts of 
Access to Gender-Confirmation Surgery, 27 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. J. 165, 165, 174 (2018) (writing 
that the “federal government tracks and provides for its people through the federal administrative 
state” and describing it further as an “administrative regime”). 
 62 See generally ANDREW REAMER, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INST. OF PUB. POLICY, COUNT-
ING FOR DOLLARS 2020: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
OF FEDERAL FUNDS (2017) (providing background on the Census’s role in determining the allocation 
of certain federal funds). 
 63 Akiesha Anderson, The Census Will Officially Count Same-Sex Couples for the First Time 
Ever–But That’s Not Enough, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 23, 2018), https://theconversation.com/the-
Census-will-officially-count-same-sex-couples-for-the-first-time-ever-but-thats-not-enough-89902 
[https://perma.cc/3H8Y-DB6S]. 
 64 Stansbury, supra note 30, at 408. 
 65 Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the National Imagination, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1701, 1745 (2003). 
 66 See generally MARISA HOTCHKISS & JESSICA PHELAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, USES OF CEN-
SUS BUREAU DATA IN FEDERAL FUNDS DISTRIBUTION: A NEW DESIGN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3–7 
(2017), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/working-
papers/Uses-of-Census-Bureau-Data-in-Federal-Funds-Distribution.pdf (listing programs by amount 
of funds that used census-based population numbers and population characteristics to determine fund 
distribution in fiscal year 2015). 
 67 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHY WE ASK 2020 (2019), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/factsheets/2018/comm/why-we-ask-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8SA-UA43]. 
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cial Census data as well as to “monitor the agency’s attempts to diversify tradi-
tionally monoracial neighborhoods.”68 
With their variety of applications, the Census and ACS are some “of the 
most coordinated efforts by the federal government.”69 As a result, they are 
also a powerful force in the creation of the administrative state as they have the 
ability to allocate life chances through the distribution of federal dollars.70  
C. Census and ACS Focus on Particular Subpopulations 
This Section describes three specific data points currently collected, in 
different degrees of completeness, by the Census and the ACS: sex, 
race/ethnicity, and SOGI. It highlights that the Census and ACS historically 
have collected data on sex, race and ethnicity—identities that have powerful 
prominence in structural discrimination. The government in fact collects this 
data for the very reason that discrimination based on sex, race, and ethnicity is 
pervasive throughout society.71 In short, data on sex, race, and ethnicity illumi-
nate continuing patterns of discrimination and thus allow policymakers to ad-
just laws, policies, regulations, and the enforcement of civil rights law to ad-
dress the ongoing discrimination. Without data on sex, race, and ethnicity, the 
scope of structural discrimination would remain hidden and such discrimina-
tion would remain resistant to intervention and correction.72 Conversely, col-
lecting such data allows the government to actively engage in remediating such 
discrimination and its impacts. 
The Census collects population data on sex. It does so for several reasons. 
First, the data are used to plan and fund government programming.73 Second, 
they are used to evaluate the fairness and equity in government programs and 
services for men and women.74 Third, the data are used to enforce Title IX as 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Lisa K. Pomeroy, Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Controversy Over Race 
Categorization and the 2000 Census, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 67, 74 (2000). 
 69 Pixler, supra note 32, at 1103. 
 70 See generally Spade, supra note 18, at 747 (discussing gender classification and the administra-
tive state). 
 71 See generally Letter from Senators Tom Carper and Kamala D. Harris to John H. Thomas, Dir., 
U.S. Census Bureau (May 22, 2017) [hereinafter Letter from Senators Tom Carper and Kamala D. Har-
ris], https://www.harris.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-05-22-carper-harris-letter-to-census-bureau-re-
new-subjects-press-.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKZ8-EP4X] (describing the prominence of census data 
and the importance in accounting for all people). 
 72 See, e.g., Chandra L. Ford, Public Health Critical Race Praxis: An Introduction, an Interven-
tion, and Three Points for Consideration, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 477, 480; Eva Paterson & Oren Sell-
strom, Equal Opportunity in a Post-Proposition 209 World, 26 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (1999). 
 73 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 15 (2018) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED], https://
www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/operations/planned-questions-2020-acs.pdf. 
 74 Id. 
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well as to “allocate funds to institutions of higher learning that increase partic-
ipation, particularly of minority women, in scientific and engineering programs 
under the Higher Education Act.”75 Finally, the data are used to assess em-
ployment practices under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and used by the EEOC 
to promulgate and assess equal employment opportunity guidelines.76 Eight 
different federal agencies rely on these data to analyze and enforce at least 
fourteen different federal laws.77 
The Census also collects data on race and ethnicity. The first three Census-
es (1790, 1800, and 1810) collected data only on three categories: free white 
people, “all other free persons,” and slaves.78 These categories were mandated 
by the then-controlling Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. 
Censuses since that time have varied on the different categories of race and 
ethnicity data collected.79 For example, the ethnicity category of “Hispanic, 
Latino, or Spanish origin” was added to the Census in 1970.80 The 2020 Cen-
sus will have fifteen racial categories.81 
Race and ethnicity population data are collected for several reasons. First, 
they are required for certain government programs.82 Second, they are “critical 
factors in the basic research behind numerous policies, particularly for civil 
rights.”83 Third, they are used to “evaluate government programs and policies 
to ensure they fairly and equitably serve the needs”84 of all races and ethnici-
ties, as well as to “monitor compliance with antidiscrimination laws, regula-
tions, and policies”85 such as the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act of 
1964—regarding employment opportunities.86 Fourth, states often use the data 
to ensure proper drawing of legislative districts in the redistricting process.87 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 10 (listing each agency and the 
laws for which Census and ACS data are used to analyze and enforce). 
 78 What Census Calls Us: A Historical Timeline, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (2015), http://www.pew
socialtrends.org/interactives/multiracial-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/8TXP-CXGM]. 
 79 The Censuses of 1820, 1830, and 1840 collected data on free white people, free “colored” peo-
ple, and slaves. See id. In 1850, the Census expanded its racial categories to include the following: 
white, black, mulatto, black slaves, and mulatto slaves. See id. In 1860, the category “Indian” was 
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 80 See CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED, supra note 73, at 9. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. at 9–12. 
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For example, the data inform the evaluation of federal affirmative action 
guidelines under the Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program and help 
identify whether and which populations are not receiving necessary medical 
services pursuant to the Public Health Service Act.88 Six different federal 
agencies rely on Census and ACS data to analyze and enforce fifteen federal 
laws.89 
The collection of population data for these historically marginalized 
groups supports the collection of SOGI population data in future Census and 
ACS surveys. It is beyond dispute that LGBT people have been subjected to 
institutional discrimination for generations. From the “Lavender Scare” in the 
1950s, to the criminalization of same-sex sodomy until 2003,90 to the exclu-
sion from the institution of civil marriage until 2015,91 to present day where in 
twenty-six states an LGBT person may still be fired from their job based on 
their SOGI status,92 LGBT marginalization and discrimination cannot be de-
nied.93 As a result, the federal government’s surveys should treat SOGI like 
sex, race, and ethnicity, especially on the two most important surveys, the Cen-
sus and the ACS. As described below, it is not. 
II. THE IDENTITY UNDERCOUNT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION  
AND GENDER IDENTITY 
The federal government has taken the position that it “is interested in bet-
ter understanding the sexual and gender minority community in order to better 
serve their needs” and acknowledged that this “cannot be accomplished with-
out better data on the population.”94 While a handful of specifically-targeted 
surveys do collect some SOGI data, neither the Census nor the ACS has ever 
included a SOGI population category.95 Section A provides an overview of the 
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 89 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 12. 
 90 See Kyle C. Velte, Why the Religious Right Can’t Have Its (Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It 
Too: Breaking the Preservation-Through-Transformation Dynamic in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo-
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 91 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 92 See Equality Maps: Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://
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 95 See, e.g., GARY J. GATES & FRANK NEWPORT, GALLUP, SPECIAL REPORT: 3.4% OF U.S. ADULTS 
IDENTIFY AS LGBT (2012), https://news.gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx 
 
84 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:69 
background and history of SOGI data and its relationship to the Census.96 Sec-
tion B discusses SOGI and the 2020 Census and ACS controversy.97 Section C 
discusses the present situation of SOGI data collection and the government 
surveys that collect information regarding same-sex couples.98 Section D dis-
cusses how these uncoordinated surveys collect an incomplete picture of the 
SOGI population, thus creating an Identity Undercount.99 
A. The History of SOGI Exclusion from the Census 
The Census added the relationship category of “unmarried partner” in 
1990 and the ACS added it as a category in 2005.100 This category presented 
the first opportunity to count same-sex couples who resided together and thus 
indirectly (and incompletely) obtained a partial count of LGBT people.101 
In the 1990 Census, if a same-sex couple chose the “spouse” option, the 
Census Bureau left the choice of “spouse” intact but changed the sex of the 
partner, so that the couple was counted as a different-sex couple.102 Similarly, 
if a same-sex couple checked the “unmarried partner box” in the 1990 Census, 
the Census Bureau “treated these entries as if they were in error—recoding the 
gender of one partner so that the couple showed up in data files as a different-
sex couple.”103 The Bureau ceased recoding same-sex couples who checked 
the “unmarried partner” box on the 2000 Census (though it continued to recode 
same-sex couples that checked the “married” box).104 
Prior to the recognition of nationwide marriage equality in 2015, some 
same-sex couples who were married under state law opted to report themselves 
as “married” on the 2010 Census.105 When this occurred, the Census Bureau 
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/PWS6-W4ZN] (noting that the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) 
National Survey of Family Growth collected sexual orientation data in two different surveys, one 
regarding 2002 data and another regarding 2006–2010 data). 
 96 See infra notes 100–115 and accompanying text.  
 97 See infra notes 116–128 and accompanying text.  
 98 See infra notes 129–138 and accompanying text.  
 99 See infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.  
 100 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SAME-SEX COUPLES, 
FERTILITY AND FAMILY STATISTICS BRANCH (2013) [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS], https://www2.Census.gov/topics/families/same-sex-couples/faq/sscplfactsheet-
final.pdf. The Census added the category to the CPS in 1995 and to the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP) in 1996. Id. 
 101 See LGBTQ CENSUS ADVOCACY, supra note 56. 
 102 See CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 100, at 1. 
 103 See LGBTQ CENSUS ADVOCACY, supra note 56. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 100, at 1. No states rec-
ognized marriage equality until 2003, so data from the 2000 Census reported all same-sex couples as 
unmarried couples. See id. at 1, 3. 
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would edit the response from “spouse” to “unmarried partner.”106 For the 2010 
Census, which was taken at a time when a handful of states recognized mar-
riage equality, the Census Bureau still edited responses: “When a name had at 
least a 95 percent chance of being male, but female was reported, for example, 
the gender of that spouse was changed.”107 These actions by the Census bureau 
constitute a literal straightwashing of the Census data.108 
In 2014, the Census Bureau started a content review of the ACS that pre-
sented an opportunity for LGBT-rights advocates to push for the inclusion of 
SOGI questions in that important, ongoing part of the 2020 Census.109 As a 
result of that advocacy, the Census Bureau’s National Advisory Committee 
recommended that SOGI questions be included and several federal agencies 
jointly published a best-practices report concerning the collection of such da-
ta.110 In 2015 and 2016, there was visible progress toward including SOGI 
questions in the 2020 Census and ACS.111 Specifically, (1) two prominent 
LGBT advocates and researchers were added to one of the Census Bureau’s 
national advisory committees, (2) federally-convened working groups began 
studying the need for, and feasibility of, collecting SOGI population data, and 
(3) advocates for SOGI data collection worked to educate federal agencies 
about the need for such data.112 
Because of this advocacy, in 2016, several agencies began to include 
questions soliciting SOGI data in their surveys. For example, the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics added SOGI questions to the National Crime Victimization 
Survey, including SOGI questions directed at sixteen- and seventeen-year-old 
respondents.113 In addition, HUD and HHS added SOGI questions.114 During 
the Obama Administration, HUD, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. at 1. 
 107 See id. at 3. 
 108 See Hayley Gorenberg, The Affirmative Power of Visibility, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 
2010), https://huffpost.com/entry/the-affirmative-power-of-_b_783611 [https://perma.cc/8JKT-2N6S] 
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 114 See LGBTQ CENSUS ADVOCACY, supra note 56. 
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vices, and the Environmental Protection Agency each requested that the Cen-
sus include the collection of SOGI data.115 
B. The 2020 Census and ACS Controversy 
Prior to 2017, the Census Bureau was moving toward including SOGI 
questions in the ACS and was seriously considering the inclusion of SOGI 
questions in future Censuses.116 In March of 2017, as required by the Census 
Act,117 the Trump Administration submitted its census plan to Congress, a pro-
posal that included SOGI questions in an appendix submitted with the plan.118 
Several hours later, the Administration, through the Bureau, reversed course, 
stating that the inclusion of the SOGI questions was done “in error” and was 
“inadvertent.”119 Soon thereafter, the SOGI questions were scrubbed from the 
online version of the plan submitted to Congress.120 The director of the Census 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Hansi Lo Wang, Census Bureau Caught in Political Mess Over LGBT Data, NPR (July 
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SOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/619704d091da4b54968a23720aadee0f 
[https://perma.cc/6S5Y-LH7H] (“The U.S. Census Bureau said Wednesday that it mistakenly pro-
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Bureau concluded that it was unnecessary from a federal standpoint to revise 
the Census to incorporate SOGI data.121 
The Census Bureau plans to include options for “same-sex hus-
band/wife/spouse” and “same-sex unmarried partner” in the 2020 Census.122 
This represents progress for the LGBT community because the government 
will use the data to plan and fund programs that more accurately serve com-
munities including through better understanding and serving housing needs.123 
While this is an improvement upon prior versions of the Census and ACS, 
it only collects partial population data regarding the LGBT community and 
thus provides an incomplete picture of the needs of this community. The lack 
of a full and accurate picture is particularly deleterious for LGBT people in 
poverty because middle- and upper-class people are more likely to get married 
than people living in poverty.124 Additionally, collecting data on same-sex 
households does not directly measure the SOGI for the individuals in those 
households. For example, if one of the partners is transgender or bisexual, that 
may not be captured by the current questions.125 Instead, these data provide 
only an indirect estimate of the LGBT population.126 In short, these data are 
under inclusive. They fail to capture same-sex couples who do not reside to-
                                                                                                                           
GAL (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20170329_erasing-lgbtq-people-from-census 
[https://perma.cc/S23H-V7AR] (noting that despite the fact that previous drafts had included SOGI 
questions as part of the census, the final draft submitted to Congress did not). 
 121 Tim Teeman, This Is Why the Erasing of LGBT Americans on the 2020 Census Matters, DAI-
LY BEAST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/this-is-why-the-erasing-of-lgbt-americans-
on-the-2020-census-matters [https://perma.cc/5U5C-K3TK] (quoting the Census Bureau director who 
released a statement noting that the initial version was a mistake and that the Bureau’s review “con-
cluded there was no federal data need to change the planned census and ACS subjects”). 
 122 See CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 100, at 4. 
 123 Julie Moreau, In a First, 2020 Census to Count Same-Sex Couples, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/first-2020-Census-count-same-sex-couples-n868506 [https://
perma.cc/6TMA-QPDC] (noting that these questions will help the government in “ensuring available 
housing in a community meets the needs of residents and exploring whether existing programs are 
making a difference for families”). 
 124 See, e.g., W. Bradford Wilcox & Wendy Wang, The Marriage Divide: How and Why Work-
ing-Class Families Are More Fragile Today, INST. FOR FAM. STUD. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://ifstudies.
org/blog/the-marriage-divide-how-and-why-working-class-families-are-more-fragile-today [https://
perma.cc/D3UD-36UM]. Moreover, “the discourse in which the same-sex marriage agenda [was] 
pursued . . . imposes unseen costs on the poor.” LIBBY ADLER, GAY PRIORI: A QUEER CRITICAL LE-
GAL STUDIES APPROACH TO LAW REFORM 111 (2018). Adler also explains that the “discursive ele-
ment of moral equivalency and mutual responsibility [put forward by the LGBT marriage equality 
movement] hurts the poor because . . . it operates in tandem with the neoliberal trend favoring privat-
ized family obligation.” Id. 
 125 See WORKING GRP., CURRENT MEASURES, supra note 94, at 19, 21 (explaining the confusion 
and challenges with capturing these categories of data through the surveys as written). 
 126 Id. 
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gether and they miss all of the LGBT people who are not in a relationship.127 
When it comes to poverty in particular, the data do not allow researchers to 
investigate patterns of poverty among individual LGBT people, leaving a wide 
swath of the LGBT community unaccounted for when researchers study LGBT 
poverty.128 This lack of population data means that researchers and lawmakers 
alike are missing the complete and accurate picture of what poverty looks like 
in the LGBT population. 
C. The Current State of SOGI Data Collection 
Data about same-sex couples are collected in five government surveys. 
First, the ACS collects data on same-sex couples, which are available from 
2000 to the present.129 A category for same-sex married partners was added to 
the ACS in 2013.130 Second, the American Housing Survey collects housing 
data and relevant demographic information for Congress and policy experts to 
utilize when developing national housing policy.131 Third, the CPS is a month-
ly survey sponsored by the Bureau of Labor that collects data on labor and 
employment.132 It surveys about sixty thousand households per month and has 
collected data concerning same-sex couples since 1995.133 Fourth, the Census 
has collected data regarding same-sex couples residing in the same household 
from 1990 to the present.134 Finally, the SIPP tracks the success of government 
assistance programs and income distribution.135 SIPP further provides infor-
mation about the economic well-being of the country over time and it has col-
lected data on same-sex couples since 1996.136 As noted above, however, data 
about same-sex couples are under inclusive, leaving out a majority of LGBT 
people.137 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See generally JUDITH BRADFORD ET AL., THE 2000 CENSUS AND SAME-SEX HOUSEHOLDS: A 
USER’S GUIDE 7 (2002) (providing an overview of the limitations of Census data regarding LGBT 
people but also explaining how the available data can still be useful). 
 128 See BADGETT ET AL, supra note 12, at 8. 
 129 See CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEYS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 116. 
 130 See Carol Morello, Census to Change the Way It Counts Gay Married Couples, WASH. POST 
(May 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/Census-to-change-the-way-it-counts-gay-
married-couples/2014/05/26/e6c6edd0-e2a3-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html?noredirect=on&
utm_term=.e40c6fb8d050 [https://perma.cc/YSP5-BNTX]. 
 131 See CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEYS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 116. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
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A total of eleven federal surveys collect some data regarding the sexual 
orientation of individuals.138 These are specialized surveys and therefore do 
not produce an overarching and complete picture of the LGBT population. 
D. The Identity Undercount 
The foregoing illustrates that no federal government survey collects com-
prehensive SOGI population data. Instead, the current landscape is character-
ized by a piecemeal and uncoordinated approach to gathering some but not all 
SOGI data, and thus, is insufficient to inform wide-reaching population-based 
policies to track and counter the political and economic marginalization of 
LGBT people. As the Center for American Progress and Movement Advance-
ment Project report explained the situation: 
Researchers, policymakers, and advocates struggle to understand the 
needs of the LGBT community and how changes in policy are im-
pacting the LGBT community because of a lack of data. Very few 
large, nationally representative surveys ask about sexual orientation 
and none ask about gender identity. . . . There is great need for more 
granular data—disaggregated by, for example, gender/gender identi-
ty and race/ethnicity—on the LGBT population. More data on sub-
populations is critical to developing a comprehensive understanding 
of, and then addressing, the needs of all members of the LGBT pop-
ulation. . . . A lack of disaggregated data can render invisible the ex-
periences and needs of LGBT subpopulations.139 
Researchers need surveys that collect SOGI data to accurately assess 
health, school environments, economic security, and housing and homelessness 
to better understand the impact that certain policies have on LGBT people and 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See WORKING GRP., CURRENT MEASURES, supra note 94, at 5. The federal surveys that col-
lect data regarding individual sexual orientation are the following: Health Center Patient Survey, Na-
tional Adult Tobacco Survey, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, National Health 
Interview Survey, National Inmate Survey (NIS), National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 
National Survey of Family Growth, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, National Survey on 
Drug Use and Health, National Survey of Older Americans Act Participants, and Behavior Risk Fac-
tor Surveillance System (BRFSS). See id. All but two of these surveys, the NIS and the NCVS, which 
are collected by the Department of Justice (DOJ), are collected by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services. Id. In breaking down the data collected, three of these surveys collect information re-
garding sexual attraction, four collect information regarding sexual behavior, and six collect infor-
mation regarding gender identity. Id. 
 139 See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PAYING AN UNFAIR 
PRICE: THE FINANCIAL PENALTY FOR LGBT WOMEN IN AMERICA 25 (2015) [hereinafter PAYING AN 
UNFAIR PRICE 2015], www.lgbtmap.org/file/paying-an-unfair-price-lgbt-women.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3CDE-SW6B]. 
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the disparities that exist.140 It is thus important to note that these surveys do not 
collect information that is as critical as that collected and as used for policy 
decisions in the Census.141 
This lack of comprehensive SOGI population data results in the Identity 
Undercount, a systemic erasure of LGBT identity that results in political and 
economic marginalization. As long as such data goes uncollected, the margin-
alization and the state’s role in creating that marginalization will remain largely 
invisible. 
Social scientists and LGBT-rights advocates alike have criticized the lack 
of demographic, population-based data about LGBT people in the United 
States.142 Without a clear picture of the LGBT community, namely its numbers 
and its social, political, and economic challenges, it is impossible to craft a 
meaningful agenda for change in these three key areas of civic life.143 
III. THE MYTH OF LGBT AFFLUENCE AND POWER144 
For most of the post-Stonewall era, LGBT people living in poverty are 
commonly grouped together with either the LGBT community or the “poor” 
community and thus “rarely are identified as a distinct group.”145 In recent 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Id. (noting that “[m]ore precise data collection, stronger samples, and larger sample sizes will 
allow us to precisely examine disparities facing LGBT people and specifically, how different LGBT 
communities are impacted by different disparities”). 
 141 See Disappearing Act, supra note 120 (noting that these groups were not “doing anything 
comparable to the importance of the Census info”). 
 142 See, e.g., BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 127, at 7 (discussing the limitations of the Census 
regarding same-sex couples and the LGBT community). 
 143 See Marcus & Goldberg, supra note 120 (noting that professionals in various sectors of socie-
ty are unable to provide for the community without accurate data); see also Leonore F. Carpenter & R. 
Barrett Marshall, Walking While Trans: Profiling of Transgender Women by Law Enforcement, and 
the Problem of Proof, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 23–24 (2017) (describing that data collec-
tion regarding police harassment does not account for transgender victims of such harassment and 
explaining its negative consequences for the transgender community); Woods, supra note 10, at 708 
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of the criminal process including detention and arrest, charging, conviction, sentencing, and probation 
and parole” and arguing that such “statistical gaps make it difficult to identify and to address LGBT-
based inequality at these different points of the criminal process”). 
 144 The data about the LGBT community that Parts II and III describe and discuss should not be 
mistaken for comprehensive, meaningful data about that community. Rather, because there is no such 
set of comprehensive data, the data described in these sections represent only estimates of the com-
munity and its subparts. The data are pulled largely from studies conducted by the Williams Institute 
at the University of California, Los Angeles and a 2012 Gallup Poll. Because exact data about the 
LGBT community does not yet exist, the estimates that emerge from the Williams Institute and Gallup 
form the basis for analysis and recommendations contained in this Article. See generally, Maria 
Dominguez, Update: LGBTQ Seniors and Federal Surveys, QNOTES (June 15, 2017), https://goq
notes.com/51138/update-lgbtq-seniors-and-federal-surveys/ [https://perma.cc/SXW9-LRXG] (ex-
plaining that some institutions have been able to provide meaningful data on the LGBTQ population). 
 145 Eric Heinze, Gay and Poor, 38 HOW. L.J. 433, 434 (1995). 
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years, however, scholars and researchers have given more attention to poverty 
within the LGBT community with results that are both staggering and dis-
heartening.146 Section A discusses media and its influence on portraying the 
myth of LGBT people as wealthy and powerful.147 Section B provides infor-
mation regarding the reality of economic security in the LGBT community and 
covers topics such as education, housing, and food insecurity.148 
A. The Myth 
There are very few images of LGBT poverty in the mainstream media.149 
In contrast, a narrative of gay affluence and power persists, fueling a persistent 
stereotype that LGBT people are wealthy, powerful, and affluent.150 The stere-
otype also asserts that LGBT people are “well-educated, professional elite, 
occupying positions of power and influence in the workplace and society at 
large.”151 One common source of this stereotype is the typical portrayal of the 
LGBT community in the mass media predominantly through imagery of gay, 
white, professional men with no children.152 From the 1990s television sit-com 
Will & Grace, to Ellen DeGeneres, Rachel Maddow, Anderson Cooper, 
Laverne Cox, and the named plaintiff in the 2015 marriage equality case, Jim 
Obergefell, such imagery is ubiquitous and enduring.153 Scaffolding this myth 
of affluence and power is the “DINK” myth—the myth that LGBT people have 
“double income, no kids” with “no family responsibilities to hamper their job 
advancement or accumulation of wealth.”154 Further scaffolding the myth of 
affluence and power is the myth of the conspicuous consumer, specifically that 
LGBT people are self-indulgent, focused on consuming goods, and have a 
taste for high-end goods.155 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See, e.g., Brad Sears & Lee Badgett, Beyond Stereotypes: Poverty in the LGBT Community, 
WILLIAMS INST. (June 2012), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/williams-in-the-news/beyond-
stereotypes-poverty-in-the-lgbt-community/ [https://perma.cc/GQN7-3NUS]; see also ADLER, supra 
note 124, at 2–3, 176–211. 
 147 See infra notes 149–167 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 168–253 and accompanying text. 
 149 See Sears & Badgett, supra note 146. 
 150 See id. 
 151 M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS 
AND GAY MEN 1 (2001). 
 152 See Sears & Badgett, supra note 146. 
 153 See generally Lorena Blas, Who Tops the “Out” Power 50 List of LGBTQ Influencers?, USA 
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stream culture). 
 154 BADGETT, supra note 151, at 1. 
 155 Id. at 2 (describing the stereotype that LGBT people are “hedonistic and consumption-
oriented, an ideal niche market for upscale products”). 
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This trope has been utilized in litigation by parties seeking to deny LGBT 
people basic civil rights. For example, in the litigation of Romer v. Evans, the 
State of Colorado asserted that LGBT people are disproportionately wealthy as 
compared to the general population and thus do not suffer any negative conse-
quences from anti-LGBT discrimination.156 The narrative of gay affluence of-
ten is woven into the narrative that LGBT people are seeking “special rights” 
when they seek civil rights, such as through passage of antidiscrimination 
laws.157 
Some judges have bought into the myth of gay affluence. In his Romer 
dissent, Justice Scalia reasoned that LGBT people have significant political 
leverage because of their high income levels—as a result, he found Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 to be “an entirely reasonable provision which does not even dis-
favor homosexuals in any substantive sense” and instead, “merely denies them 
preferential treatment.”158 On his way to this conclusion, Justice Scalia also 
opined that it was “nothing short of preposterous” for the majority to describe 
LGBT people as “politically unpopular” because LGBT people are “a group 
which enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics, and which, 
as the trial court here noted, though composing no more than 4% of the popu-
lation had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2.”159 
How, when, and where did these myths originate? The gay wealth and 
power myth is long-held; writers in the ancient Roman era asserted that “ho-
mosexuality was a weakness of the upper classes.”160 Additionally, the fact that 
LGBT people may hide their sexual orientation by staying in the “closet” 
means that many non-LGBT people are only aware of and familiar with very 
prominent, and thus powerful or wealthy, LGBT people.161 More recently, the 
myth has been sustained by researchers, even LGBT-friendly researchers, who 
select a homogenous “sample” population to study—one that is disproportion-
ately of a high economic status and not representative of a majority of the 
LGBT population.162 Finally, some of this misinformation comes from market-
ing surveys that have found lesbian, gay, and bisexual people to make up one 
                                                                                                                           
 156 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Poli-
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of society’s more affluent communities that is able to gain a presence through 
its financial capabilities.163 The respondents to these surveys are resoundingly 
not representative of the LGBT population.164 
The promulgation and perpetuation of the myth of LGBT affluence is 
harmful to the LGBT community in several ways. Just as the “stereotypes of 
high incomes for Jewish families are a staple of anti-Semitism,” the myth of 
gay affluence is a mainstay of the rhetoric harnessed by opponents of LGBT 
equality.165 In fact, the myth of gay affluence has taken on trope-like status in 
legislative debates about antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people.166 
The argument is made that LGBT people are wealthier than most non-LGBT 
people and thus have unfettered spending power and political influence. As a 
result, they are not victims of discrimination so any claim for LGBT antidiscrim-
ination law is unnecessary at best or a claim for “special rights” at worst.167 
B. The Reality 
As noted above, federal population data collection efforts do not include 
SOGI per se; rather, a few federal surveys collect data about same-sex couples. 
Because of a lack of meaningful SOGI data, the full picture of poverty in the 
LGBT community is not accurately painted. The description of LGBT poverty 
in this Part is pulled largely from work done by the Williams Institute, an 
LGBT think tank based at the UCLA School of Law.168 Researchers at the Wil-
liams Institute rely on all available data, albeit scarce and incomplete, includ-
ing data collected by non-governmental organizations such as Gallup and the 
National Center for Transgender Equality,169 and surveys conducted by states, 
such as the California Health Interview Survey.170 The description below is 
thus the best picture we currently have of LGBT poverty, but it is neither com-
plete nor accurate because of the paucity of data that realistically could only be 
collected by the federal government.171 The limited studies that have been done 
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 170 BADGETT ET AL., supra note 12, at 1. 
 171 Id. at 25 (recommending “an expansion of the number of state and federal surveys” that collect 
SOGI data because “[t]aking this crucial step” will provide information necessary for researchers to 
“draw firmer, more generalizable conclusions about” the entire LGBT community). 
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show remarkable levels of poverty across the LGBT community.172 These stud-
ies include data on same-sex couples as well as individual members of the 
LGBT communities. 
This reality of economic insecurity in the LGBT community shatters the 
myth of gay affluence and power.173 Although LGBT people experience pov-
erty based on non-SOGI factors, such as race, ethnicity, and disability, institu-
tionalized discrimination against LGBT people plays a significant part in the 
disparate poverty rates in the LGBT community.174 Both as couples and indi-
vidually, LGBT people are more vulnerable to poverty.175 Economic insecurity, 
rather than affluence, is the reality for most LGBT people, even after research-
ers control for other factors understood to influence the likelihood of being in 
poverty.176 The summaries below describe the situation of subpopulations of 
the LGBT community who are living in poverty, as well as the areas of life in 
which structural discrimination contributes to LGBT poverty. 
Moreover, there is a troubling disconnect between the reality of LGBT 
poverty and the public policy discussions, including legislative debates, about 
poverty in general.177 Legislatures and policymakers alone are not to blame; 
until very recently, poverty has not been a top policy item for national LGBT 
organizations.178 It was not until 2009 that a national LGBT organization pub-
lished a study addressing LGBT poverty.179 
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1. Lesbian and Bisexual Women 
Studies directed only at lesbian women reveal an intersection between 
gender and sexual orientation, resulting in what amounts to a financial penalty 
for lesbian women.180 Women in this population aged eighteen to forty-four are 
poorer than heterosexual women across all data sets.181 White lesbian and bi-
sexual women face two levels of employment discrimination, sex-based and 
sexual-orientation-based, and lesbian and bisexual women of color are subject 
to a third level of discrimination that is race-based.182 Employment discrimina-
tion further contributes to economic insecurity and poverty.183 Twenty-four 
percent of lesbians and bisexual women live in poverty, while only 19% of 
their heterosexual counterparts live in poverty.184 
2. Gay Men 
A growing body of data reveals the extent of the myth of gay affluence: 
gay men earn from 13% to 32% less than their heterosexual counterparts.185 
The “equal pay for equal work” rallying cry most often associated with the 
gender pay gap thus must also be used to educate the public and lawmakers 
alike about the plight of gay men in the workplace. Lower wages due to dis-
crimination in the workforce further contribute to economic insecurity and 
poverty.186 
3. Female Same-Sex Couples 
Using data gleaned from the “unmarried partner” category of the 2000 
Census, the Williams Institute concluded that 6.9% of lesbian couples lived 
below the federal poverty line, as compared to 5.4% of married heterosexual 
couples.187 Couples with children also revealed disparities in poverty levels. 
9.4% of lesbian couples with children lived below the poverty line, compared 
with 6.7% of heterosexual couples.188 Finally, older lesbian couples (above the 
age of sixty-five) were poorer than their heterosexual counterparts, with 9.1% 
of such lesbian couples living below the poverty line, as compared to 4.6% of 
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married heterosexual couples.189 “After adjusting for certain characteristics . . . 
the study found that lesbian couples were significantly more likely—and gay 
male couples slightly more likely—to be in poverty than heterosexual married 
couples with the same characteristics.”190 Finally, the income of lesbian cou-
ples is far below the income of heterosexual or gay male couples.191 
4. Children of Same-Sex Couples 
The adults in same-sex couples with children who all reside in the same 
household are much more likely to be in poverty than similarly situated differ-
ent-sex married couples.192 Overall, children of same-sex couples live in pov-
erty at twice the rate of children in different-sex married couple households.193 
Male same-sex couples with children in the household are most vulnera-
ble to poverty with 19.2% of them in poverty.194 Female same-sex couples 
with children residing in the household are the next-most-likely to live in pov-
erty, with 15.4% living in poverty.195 In contrast, married couples with children 
residing in the household have a poverty rate of only 9.3%.196 Race plays a 
role in the overall higher rate of poverty for children of same-sex parents, as 
the highest poverty rate involves children who are African-American and live 
with two male fathers.197 Lastly, single LGBT parents who are raising children 
are three times more likely to have an annual income close to the poverty 
line.198 
5. Transgender People 
One study has described the “rampant economic marginalization” experi-
enced by transgender people; high poverty and unemployment rates and em-
ployment discrimination are key features.199 In fact, employment discrimina-
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tion against transgender people is often blamed for the high rates of unem-
ployment in that community.200 Low earnings are also a problem for 
transgender people as data have shown that 22% to 64% report earnings less 
than $25,000 per year.201 Another study showed that “transgender people are 
four times as likely to have a household income under $10,000 and twice as 
likely [as their cisgender counterparts] to be unemployed.”202 
Homelessness is also higher for transgender people than cisgender people. 
In one study from California, 20% of survey participants revealed that they had 
been homeless since coming out as transgender.203 Gender-segregated home-
less facilities with transphobic placement policies turn transgender people away 
from homeless shelters, which often are the last resource between a transgender 
person and homelessness.204 
6. Same-Sex Couples of Color 
African-American same-sex couples are particularly vulnerable to pov-
erty, as they have a poverty rate at least twice the rate of different-sex, married 
African-American couples.205 Moreover, African-American men in same-sex 
couples are more than six times more likely to be poor than similarly situated 
white men.206 African-American women in same-sex relationships are three 
times more likely to be poor than are similarly situated white women.207 His-
panic people in same-sex couples are more likely to be poor than their white 
same-sex couple counterparts.208 These disparities reveal the intersection of 
race-based and SOGI-based discrimination.209 
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 202 See Sears & Badgett, supra note 146. 
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 205 BADGETT ET AL., supra note 12, at 11. 
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of black men in same-sex households are poor). 
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7. Regional Differences 
Just as many believe—incorrectly—that LGBT people are affluent in re-
lation to the heterosexual population, many also incorrectly believe that LGBT 
people live exclusively in urban areas.210 Professor Luke Boso describes the 
consequences of this “urban bias,” including, among others, the fact that it 
“masks the vulnerability and needs of those who fail to subscribe to urbanized 
norms.”211 
As Boso points out, LGBT people reside in rural and urban areas, and the 
geographic distinction of where LGBT people live affects their likelihood of 
living in poverty.212 Regarding same-sex couples, living in large, metropolitan 
areas decreases their risk of poverty as compared with their different-sex cou-
ple counterparts, while living outside of large or medium-sized cities increases 
that risk.213 
8. LGBT Schoolchildren 
School climate has a direct connection to educational outcomes, which in 
turn impacts long-term economic stability.214 When children feel unsafe in 
school, or where they are actually unsafe, learning suffers.215 Studies show that 
many LGBT schoolchildren feel unsafe or are unsafe in American schools.216 
This homo- and trans-phobic climate manifests itself through peer harassment, 
bullying, and assault, as well as through structural discrimination, such as tran-
sphobic bathroom policies that force transgender schoolchildren to use gender-
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 214 PAYING AN UNFAIR PRICE 2015, supra note 139, at 17 (“Education remains a cornerstone in 
achieving economic security. . . . Yet for LGBT women, unsafe and unwelcoming schools can make 
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 215 See id. at 17–18. 
 216 Id. at 1. 
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segregated facilities consistent with the sex listed on their birth certificate.217 A 
hostile school climate leads to academic underachievement through both ab-
senteeism and an inability to focus while in school.218 LGBT students are also 
disciplined more often and more harshly than their straight and cisgender 
counterparts.219 Academic underachievement, in turn, leads students to drop 
out of school or to end their education upon completion of high school, which 
in turn leads to unemployment or employment in low-wage jobs with few or 
no benefits.220  
LGBT youth in the foster care and juvenile justice systems may be diffi-
cult to place and often face caseworkers and other institutional actors that lack 
the cultural competence to properly address the SOGI-related issues of these 
youth; this is particularly true of transgender youths in these systems.221 These 
negative educational and employment outcomes are even worse for African-
American students.222 The poverty-related consequences of unsafe schools in-
clude higher costs for LGBT students who seek safer educational environments 
and suffer from reduced graduation rates, which is connected to diminished 
employment prospects and lower earnings.223 
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100 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:69 
9. Housing 
Housing discrimination based on SOGI is legal in twenty-six states.224 
While there are some protections from SOGI discrimination in several federal 
housing programs, there is no federal law that explicitly forbids relying on 
SOGI to evict a tenant, refuse to rent to a prospective tenant, or refuse a hous-
ing loan.225 Data confirm that such discrimination is occurring. HUD found 
that 16% of the time, landlords preferred to rent housing to a different-sex 
couple over a same-sex couple.226 LGBT elders who are in same-sex couples 
also face housing discrimination as 48% of LGBT same-sex couples experi-
enced “adverse treatment compared to an opposite-sex couple when exploring 
a move to an independent living, continuing care or assisted living facility.”227 
Transgender women also face housing discrimination, perhaps more than other 
segments of the LGBT population. In one study, 19% of transgender women 
reported being refused a home or apartment, while 11% reported they had been 
evicted; as a result of this discrimination, 50% of transgender women reported 
they had moved to other housing, as compared to 34% of transgender men who 
said they had been forced to move due to discrimination.228 The poverty-
related consequences of housing discrimination include housing instability that 
leads to time in emergency shelters, higher housing costs or less desirable 
housing options, longer and more costly housing searches, and increased loan 
and insurance costs.229 
Finally, homeless shelters—which are often sex-segregated—are often the 
last social support between a person living in economic security and falling 
into poverty, and they consistently turn away transgender clients based on out-
dated policies that require clients to be placed based on their sex assigned at 
birth rather than their gender identity.230 Housing insecurity increases the risk 
of living in poverty. Because of the dearth of SOGI population data necessary 
to paint an accurate picture of how housing and shelter discrimination impacts 
LGBT people, it is presently impossible to enact robust protective policies or 
institute new housing programming to adequately address this rampant dis-
crimination. 
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10. Food Insecurity 
LGBT adults experience food insecurity—not having enough money to 
purchase food for themselves or their family within the last year—at a higher 
rate than their non-LGBT counterparts.231 These LGBT adults are thus more 
likely to have participated in the federal government’s Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), administered by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA).232 Having such uncertain access to adequate food is not evenly 
experienced across the LGBT community. Rather, LGBT women, LGBT 
youth, LGBT people of color, unmarried LGBT people, LGBT people without 
a college degree, and LGBT people raising children are more vulnerable to 
food insecurity than other segments of the LGBT population.233 With respect to 
data collection, the USDA conducts ongoing surveys to monitor food insecuri-
ty.234 The largest and most significant survey is the CPS Food Security Sup-
plement, conducted once a year by the U.S. Census Bureau as a supplement to 
the CPS.235 Neither of these two surveys collects SOGI data, meaning that “re-
searchers cannot analyze these data to examine food insecurity among LGBT-
headed households.”236 
* * * 
Why does much of the LGBT community live in poverty at levels higher 
than the general population? Why does it lack political power to change these 
circumstances? Without more data—the type that could be provided by the 
Census and the ACS—scholars, advocates, and policymakers are left using 
incomplete data to hypothesize about the answer to these questions.237 
Most agree that a confluence of several factors contributes to higher lev-
els of LGBT poverty, including (until 2015) the denial of access to civil mar-
riage, employment discrimination, the denial of family benefits, and the gen-
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eral denial of full civil rights.238 The lack of opportunity to legally marry meant 
that many LGBT people could not take advantage of the economic benefits of 
interdependence that comes with marriage.239 In addition, LGBT youth make 
up a disproportionate portion of the youth homeless population because their 
parents hold biases, and thus, reject them and kick them out of their homes.240 
All of these factors contribute to the cycles of poverty that LGBT people en-
counter. 
The wage gap and unemployment of LGBT people, along with employ-
ment discrimination that is still legal in most states, leads to lack of health in-
surance (or sporadic health insurance coverage), reduced savings, housing in-
security, and general economic insecurity.241 Barriers to employment for 
transgender people are often compounded: not only do they face legal em-
ployment discrimination in many states, many states also make it extremely 
burdensome to change the gender marker on their identity documents, making 
it even more difficult to secure employment.242 In addition, LGBT people have 
a higher risk of being homeless, beginning in their youth.243 
Discrimination in health care, especially for transgender people, also creates 
poverty. Because of discriminatory laws and policies—such as public accommo-
dation laws that allow physicians to turn away LGBT would-be patients and in-
surance policies that exclude medical procedures that are critical for a transition-
ing transgender person244—securing competent and consistent healthcare often is 
a challenge for LGBT people.245 In one study, 56% of lesbian, bisexual, and 
gay respondents, and 70% of transgender respondents reported discrimination 
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in a healthcare environment.246 Poverty-related consequences of health care 
discrimination include delayed (and thus often more expensive) medical care, 
higher out-of-pocket expenses for medical care, and lost productivity at work 
due to more work absences.247 Lack of access to medical care leads to both 
economic insecurity and to negative health outcomes, which in turn can impact 
employability, thus creating a cycle of economic insecurity and poverty.248 
Limited data on these health care disparities mean that meaningful policies, 
laws, or other interventions cannot be adequately crafted. Adding SOGI ques-
tions to health surveys such as the BRFSS is critical for advocates, researchers, 
policymakers, and service providers who need comprehensive and accurate 
data on the LGBT population to craft effective responses to these disparities.249 
In short, “legalized employment, housing, and healthcare discrimination” 
all combine to create a disproportionate poverty level for many LGBT peo-
ple.250 These same factors lend themselves to diminished political power.251 
The LGBT community’s fraught (and longstanding) relationship with law en-
forcement is another source of powerlessness. From the beginning of the mod-
ern LGBT civil rights movement at the Stonewall Inn252 to the modern-day 
phenomenon of “walking while trans,”253 the mistreatment of the LGBT com-
munity by the law enforcement community sets up a power dynamic—one in 
which the LGBT community is further marginalized—that diminishes LGBT 
political power. 
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IV. THE HARMS OF THE IDENTITY UNDERCOUNT 
The harms of the Identity Undercount cannot fully be known—precisely 
because we do not have the data needed to fully know them. A number of rea-
sonable inferences may, however, be made based on what we do know now. 
This Part describes those harms, which include dignitary, economic, and politi-
cal harms. Section A discusses how the Identity Undercount perpetuates stereo-
types contributing to the negative consequences of LGBT equality.254 Section 
B discusses programs that address inequalities in society and how LGBT peo-
ple are often left out from the benefits that these programs provide.255 Section 
C discusses the negative impact of exclusion on the dignity of LGBT peo-
ple.256 Sections D and E discuss additional harms to LGBT populations, in-
cluding the economic and political consequences.257 Section F discusses the 
particular harms that LGBT people of color experience as a result of the Identi-
ty Undercount.258 Section G concludes this Part by explaining the societal con-
sequences of not accurately collecting SOGI data.259  
A. The Perpetuation of Harmful Stereotypes 
The Identity Undercount perpetuates a set of stereotypes that are deeply 
harmful to addressing LGBT equality, including economic inequality. These 
include most conspicuously the stereotype that LGBT people are wealthy, as 
well as the stereotype that LGBT people only live in urban environments. This 
latter stereotype leads to an “urban bias” by courts and LGBT advocates 
alike.260 
The perpetuation of this set of stereotypes contributes to the continuation 
of anti-LGBT discrimination, which in turn contributes substantially to LGBT 
poverty. Put another way, the perpetuation of these stereotypes makes the need 
for LGBT-inclusive antidiscrimination laws seem less pressing because LGBT 
people are presumed to be doing well. Moreover, it obscures the need for the 
enforcement of the LGBT-inclusive antidiscrimination laws that do exist. Fi-
nally, it allows opponents of LGBT equality to minimize the harm to LGBT 
people. For example, religious exemptions are thought not to harm LGBT peo-
ple because they are presumed to live in large metropolitan areas where they 
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have access to a multitude of providers of goods and services. In failing to col-
lect SOGI population data—data that almost certainly will show dispropor-
tionate levels of poverty in the LGBT community, as well as significant num-
bers of LGBT people living in rural communities—the state actively constructs 
poverty among the LGBT community. Failing to facilitate and aggressively 
pursue antidiscrimination measures targeted at the LGBT community, the state 
also perpetuates this poverty.261 
B. Inability to Create or Modify (in Substance or Delivery Model) 
Programs Targeted at Population-Level Disparities 
There are many programs targeted at population-level disparities in out-
comes based on race and ethnicity as a result of Census population data col-
lected for those groups. For example, with regard to population-level health 
disparities, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services uses racial and eth-
nic Census data, which “have revealed important differences in the extent and 
nature of disparities for different minority subgroups and the need to tailor in-
terventions to specific subgroups.”262 More specifically, such data allow public 
health officials to identify risks for smoking, unsafe sexual practices, and envi-
ronmental factors along racial and ethnic population-level lines for the purpose 
of “allocating health care resources and developing appropriate public health 
interventions.”263 
Census and ACS racial and ethnic data are also used to compare educa-
tional outcomes of different racial and ethnic groups, including to measure the 
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rates at which different races and ethnicities utilize educational programs and 
interventions, to track changes over time, and to assess such programs and in-
terventions.264 
The development of similar programs around LGBT disparities is sub-
stantially hindered by a lack of data about LGBT disparities. The incomplete 
data that do exist indicate, for example, disparities for LGBT schoolchildren 
and health disparities for LGBT people generally.265 Without comprehensive 
data, the full scope of these disparities can neither be known nor used to in-
form decisions regarding interventions to disrupt those disparities. 
Moreover, we currently do not know how many LGBT people living in 
poverty simply do not apply for government assistance because they fear dis-
crimination.266 Coming out to intake or other staff at government assistant of-
fices carries with it the risk of being turned away because of one’s SOGI sta-
tus, a fear particularly salient in smaller and rural communities and for 
transgender people, who may not have consistent gender markers on their 
identity documents.267 To the extent LGBT people may experience stigma and 
discrimination within social services, they may be underutilizing the anti-
poverty programs that in theory should be available to them. 
For example, some homeless shelters turn away transgender people based 
on transphobic policies about placement in sex-segregated facilities.268 Moreo-
ver, the recent wave of cases seeking religious exemptions in public accom-
modations indicates that this is a likely phenomenon.269 
Federal and state governments often funnel funds to religious organiza-
tions to implement anti-poverty programs. This government-church partnership 
began with President Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty” campaign and con-
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tinues today.270 For example, Catholic Charities, a nonprofit, religiously-based 
group whose mission is to provide services to people in poverty, receives 65% of 
its annual budget from federal and state funding.271 Religiously-affiliated anti-
poverty charities have thus become “an arm of the federal welfare state.”272 
The current wave of religious exemption cases,273 however, demonstrates 
that anti-poverty programs delivered via religiously-based organizations fund-
ed with federal money may seek to turn LGBT people away.274 Census and 
other government survey data about the number of LGBT people in poverty 
and the services they seek and receive (or do not receive) would shine a light 
on the extent to which LGBT people are denied such services through claims 
of religious exemption.275 This information could inform not only the federal 
government’s decision to give funding to faith-based organizations, but could 
also inform litigants, attorneys, and courts as they seek to answer the unan-
swered questions surrounding the claims for religious exemptions from anti-
discrimination laws.276  
In sum, population data collection would allow us to better understand 
whether this phenomenon exists, either based on religious objections or secular 
homophobia/transphobia, and to address it to the extent it does. 
Finally, some government programs that help alleviate poverty may be 
built on a model of heterosexual or marital parenting that may not serve LGBT 
parents and their children. For example, in families consisting of unmarried 
partners with children, one of whom is not a legal parent to the child, seeking 
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child support from the non-legal parent is difficult if not impossible.277 We 
cannot know more about this phenomenon without data collection and thus 
cannot address such structural barriers that prevent LGBT parents, for exam-
ple, from accessing resources to diminish poverty. 
C. The Dignitary Harms of the Identity Undercount 
The Identity Undercount erases the existence of LGBT people from the 
national community and the nation’s conscience. Including such data would 
make LGBT lives more visible and would normalize LGBT people and fami-
lies.278 Invisibility is harmful. Omission from the Census and ACS “sends a 
wider and more profound message around erasure at a time when LGBT rights 
themselves are under attack.”279 The Identity Undercount creates LGBT invisi-
bility because the identities counted in the Census not only reflect the reality of 
identity categories but also play a role in constructing that reality.280 Invisibil-
ity leads to ignorance, which in turn leads to discrimination and the under-
servicing of LGBT Americans living in poverty.281 When a group is “other-
ized” to such an extent that the basic fact about the size of their community is 
unknown, that group becomes even less human and even more abstract, both 
of which make it easier to discriminate against that group.282 Visibility, in con-
trast, creates humanity and power. There is “a symbiotic relationship between 
categories for the tabulation of data and the processes of group consciousness 
and social recognition, which in turn can be reflected in specific legislation and 
social policy.”283 
Furthermore, coming out matters—for the LGBT individual’s emotional 
and mental health, their dignity, as well as for political power. Stories matter. 
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Stories mobilize movements. Stories attract allies. LGBT stories cannot be ful-
ly told without SOGI Census population data.284 Moreover, the inclusion of 
SOGI questions on the Census and ACS sends a signal that LGBT lives matter 
and that they count. This message may further encourage more LGBT people 
to come out in other facets of their lives—beyond coming out in their response 
to the census question—an act central to self-autonomy and dignity.285 
We can therefore conceptualize the omission of SOGI questions from the 
Census and ACS as another version of the closet—the “Census closet”—not 
unlike the “case law closet” built by Bowers v. Hardwick.286 Like Bowers,287 
the omission of SOGI questions on the Census and ACS renders the govern-
ment an active participant in building a closet for LGBT people, which in turn 
denies them dignity and humanity.288 It is a redux of what scholars in the 1990s 
revealed, explained, and illuminated as “coerced invisibility.”289 This is admin-
istrative closeting, rather than legislative or judicial. 
D. The Economic Harms of the Identity Undercount 
The “life chances” the government distributes as a result of Census data 
are numerous. It does so through programs designed to increase access to the 
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workforce, housing, health care, food, educational opportunities, and credit, to 
name just a few.290 But without inclusive data, policymakers, social service 
providers, and others are unable to know if these activities meet the needs of 
LGBT people and help them thrive. Without this information, stereotypes and 
myths may drive policies that impact LGBT people.291 Put another way, LGBT 
poverty—which could be ameliorated through government programs tailored 
to LGBT people—can put LGBT on different life paths, impacting their oppor-
tunities for education, employment, and marriage.292 
Discrimination in employment often leads to economic insecurity and 
poverty. Although there is no federal law that explicitly protects against SOGI 
discrimination in housing, employment, or public accommodation, some states 
do have such antidiscrimination laws.293 Moreover, some courts have held that 
Title VII, the federal law that prohibits sex-based employment discrimination, 
and Title IX, the federal law that prohibits sex-based educational discrimina-
tion by any school that receives federal funds, include SOGI discrimination 
within their protections.294 Without Census and ACS SOGI data, an analysis of 
the enforcement of these two federal laws with respect to LGBT people is not 
possible. Moreover, states use population data collected by the federal gov-
ernment to analyze the efficacy and enforcement of state antidiscrimination 
law for all protected classes, such as sex, race, and SOGI; in those states where 
antidiscrimination law includes SOGI, such analysis is impossible with regard 
to SOGI, but possible for other protected classes, such as sex.295 Tracking SOGI 
discrimination in relation to Title VII and Title IX connects directly to LGBT 
poverty, as employment discrimination is a factor that leads to poverty, as are 
adverse educational outcomes caused by under enforcement of Title IX. 
The economic harms created or perpetuated by the Identity Undercount 
lead to social harms. As noted in Part III, LGBT people are disproportionately 
subject to poverty (including homelessness) and to domestic and other vio-
lence.296 In addition, LGBT people suffer negative health outcomes, both in 
mental and physical wellness, at disproportionate rates. Without SOGI data, 
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there is no way to capture a thorough portrait of the LGBT community and its 
attendant needs. 
Public policy organizations, such as the Williams Institute, have done 
their best to estimate the extent of these disparities, but have conceded that the 
estimates are only reasonable estimates due to the lack of SOGI data collection 
by the federal government.297 As a result, we “have painfully little in terms of 
governmental statistics on what’s needed to serve the LGBT community. That 
means fewer opportunities to fund programs that would serve LGBT needs, 
and contributes to a snowballing cycle of disadvantaging LGBT people.”298 
Moreover, the messenger often matters. Data collected and analyzed by private 
organizations may not carry the same weight or legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public and lawmakers as does the data collected by the federal government.299 
E. The Political Harms of the Identity Undercount 
The Identity Undercount creates concrete and widespread economic and 
social harms. Because the extent of the disparities that the LGBT community 
faces is not accurately quantified, advocates and lawmakers are hamstrung. It 
results in fewer opportunities to fund programs that would serve the unique 
needs of LGBT people and “contributes to a snowballing cycle of disadvantag-
ing LGBT people.”300 
Recent media accounts of LGBT schoolchildren being bullied in schools 
and treated unfairly by school administrators, of LGBT people being denied 
goods and services, and of the murder of many transgender women of color are 
reminders that LGBT people continue to suffer real consequences from mar-
ginalization, stigmatization, and legal discrimination.301 Moreover, as noted 
above, poverty is pervasive in the LGBT community. To craft responsive poli-
cies, lawmakers need accurate and complete data to draft laws and regulations 
and to garner support for such legislative measures from other lawmakers. Pol-
itics run on data; without government surveys that collect up-to-date, compre-
hensive data about what it is like to be an LGBT person in America, LGBT-
friendly lawmakers are disadvantaged.302 For this same reason, LGBT advoca-
cy groups are limited in their political power. Lacking the political power that 
comes with data to back up their claims, LGBT people are politically harmed 
by the Identity Undercount. 
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It does so by rendering LGBT people less politically powerful.303 The 
Identity Undercount means that politicians may try to argue that there are no 
LGBT people in their district, or that there is only a negligible number, one so 
low that LGBT issues are not a priority.304 Thus, without SOGI data to refine 
and flesh out data on social services, information about the extent to which 
LGBT people are discriminated against in such programs simply will not exist. 
Because “even well-intentioned policymakers often want advocates to quantify 
the cost of a particular policy proposal and the impact of unequal treatment,” 
without such data, it is more difficult to gather political clout to pass new or 
more robust antidiscrimination laws and policies.305 As one national LGBT 
organization, Lambda Legal, put it:  
How will we be able to understand how many LGBTQ people are 
living in this country and experiencing systemic financial and social 
oppressions that disadvantage them in the health care system, lead to 
elevated rates of discrimination in seeking or maintaining employ-
ment and are the root cause of poverty and homelessness? . . . An-
swer: We won’t.306 
Political clout is needed for the passage of a federal SOGI employment 
antidiscrimination bill. Such a bill has been proposed since 1974 but has yet to 
pass.307 At the state level, twenty-six states lack such laws.308 SOGI population 
data collected in government surveys likely would provide a rich and robust 
picture of employment discrimination against LGBT people (a factor in pov-
erty), and thus, provide necessary information to build the political clout and 
coalition to finally pass such legislation at the federal level and perhaps in the 
twenty-six states that still lack such protections. 
The recent wave of anti-transgender bills highlights the need for SOGI 
data as “LGBT people see newly minted, anti-LGBT legislators taking their 
positions in government, and are frightened with good reason.”309 The omis-
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sion of SOGI questions on the Census and ACS “means not only won’t LGBT 
people be counted, but all that could be gleaned about LGBT people, and who 
they are and what might best be done in terms of funding and assisting those 
who may need it most, will not be counted.”310 Opponents of regressive and 
transphobic “bathroom bills” would benefit from knowing just how many 
transgender people reside in their districts; wielding data on the number of 
constituents who will be negatively impacted by legislation makes political 
opposition to such bills more informed and thus more persuasive and power-
ful.311 And, as noted in the Introduction of this Article, when such bills pass, as 
one did in North Carolina, the data is needed to inform impact litigation ef-
forts.312 
F. The Unique Harms of the Identity Undercount to People of Color 
LGBT people of color are doubly at risk of being undercounted. Many 
people of color are literally not counted at all; this is the differential under-
count.313 For those people of color who are counted, and who also identify as 
LGBT, they experience the Identity Undercount. In one way or another, LGBT 
people of color are not fully counted. When people of color are counted, that 
racial and ethnic data is important to the enforcement of civil rights laws and 
the allocation of federal funds. When LGBT people of color are counted, only 
one axis of their identity is captured—their race—while their sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity is erased. Anti-poverty programs, state and federal 
health programs, housing programs, and antidiscrimination laws cannot be ro-
bustly analyzed or enforced when the intersectional issues of race and SOGI 
are absent from the data used for that analysis and enforcement.314 
G. We Don’t Know What We Don’t Know 
Finally, the lack of comprehensive SOGI data means that there may be un-
knowable and unknown problems that we simply cannot know without the data. 
* * * 
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The lack of government SOGI data means that LGBT people are “forced 
to go without funding for real, everyday services and remain virtually nonex-
istent in the eyes of our government.”315 Erasing LGBT people from the analy-
sis of anti-poverty programs “will have a generational impact on our communi-
ty’s ability to benefit from government programs in the way that other groups 
expect.”316 
Collecting data and using it to address structural issues of LGBT poverty 
connects with the broader goal of analyzing the role of data in discrimination 
and equality questions more generally.317 
V. MOVING FORWARD: TOWARD THE COLLECTION OF SOGI DATA 
This Part recommends that the Census and ACS begin to collect SOGI 
population data as one way to begin to understand and address LGBT poverty. 
Section A begins with an overview of the mechanics of adding SOGI ques-
tions.318 Section B addresses common critiques of government data collection 
generally and concludes that SOGI data should be collected, notwithstanding 
the validity of these critiques.319 
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A. The Methods and Mechanics of Adding SOGI Questions 
Before SOGI questions may be added to the Census or ACS, there must 
be a programmatic need for the data collected through such questions. Federal 
law requires that (1) Congress approve all new ACS questions; and (2) all ACS 
questions have some connection with federal funding.320 In other words, there 
must be a programmatic need for particular kinds of data before questions col-
lecting such data will be approved and added to the Census or ACS.321 
As described in detail above, the Identity Undercount and the harms it 
causes reflect a programmatic need for such data. There is a myriad of federal 
government-funded programs, all of which rely on data gathered by the gov-
ernment, that cannot assess whether they are serving all of those who need 
benefits without collecting SOGI population data. Working groups and expert 
panels assembled by the government acknowledge the need for the collection 
of SOGI data.322 Additionally, several agencies, including a committee of the 
U.S. Senate,323 HUD,324 HHS,325 and the DOJ326 have written letters to the 
Census Bureau requesting the collection of SOGI data and explaining the pro-
grammatic needs for such data collection.327 Some members of Congress have 
taken note of the importance of collecting SOGI data in federal surveys and 
have proposed legislation such as the LGBT Data Inclusion Act to mandate 
collection of such data while at the same time recognizing the privacy and con-
fidentiality concerns that are unique to LGBT people.328 
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Inclusion of SOGI questions in the Census or ACS could come about in 
one of two ways. First, if the political will to add the questions were present, as 
it was during the Obama Administration, the director of the U.S. Census can 
simply add the SOGI questions to the Census or ACS when it submits it to 
Congress. As long as the questions were added consistent with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), have a programmatic need, and are politically palat-
able to Congress, they will be added. 
Second, assuming that the current lack of political will demonstrated by 
the Trump Administration will continue, litigation seeking an injunction re-
quiring the Census Bureau to add SOGI questions is the only means of getting 
such questions added.329 Although the specific contours of such a lawsuit are 
outside the scope of this Article, a complaint likely would center on the APA’s 
arbitrary and capricious standard and the Equal Protection Clause, rather than 
the Constitution’s Census Clause. 
Once such data is collected and analyzed, solutions to LGBT poverty may 
take two different policy approaches: one policy approach is to focus on anti-
poverty programs generally, and the second policy approach is to focus on 
LGBT-specific programs.330 Poverty-focused policies, that focus on either or 
both preventing poverty and assisting people out of poverty, benefit LGBT and 
non-LGBT people alike.331 LGBT-focused policies, such as passing antidis-
crimination laws, agency policies to ensure cultural competency by the provid-
ers of anti-poverty programs, and creating greater health care coverage for 
LGBT people, benefit LGBT people specifically.332 Without complete SOGI 
population data about all LGBT Americans, it will not be possible to make in-
formed policy decisions on either front. The same is true for the intra-
community poverty variances within the LGBT community. Without more 
complete and accurate SOGI population data, lawmakers cannot make in-
formed decisions about policies that might affect rural LGBT people, LGBT 
youth, LGBT parents and their children, and LGBT people of color, all of 
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which are subpopulations within the LGBT community that face higher rates 
of poverty than their counterparts outside of the LGBT community.333 
B. Critiques of Government Data Collection 
Many people do not give much thought to government data collection 
through the Census and ACS; rather, it is seen as a part of everyday life in the 
United States, a huge country with a behemoth administrative infrastructure 
that serves over 325 million people. In fact, the creation of Census categories 
and the effects of such classification “rarely appear as controversial political 
decisions because people who find the commonly evoked societal norms used 
in classification familiar and comfortable tend to take these classification sys-
tems as neutral givens in their lives.”334 This attitude toward the Census as a 
neutral, value-free, and innocuous survey is common.335 This Section summa-
rizes two prevalent critiques of government data collection, both of which re-
veal that it is not neutral and innocuous. To the contrary, it is political, discrim-
inatory, and constitutive of identity categories to which government resources 
are allocated in a manner that doles out life chances in unequal ways. 
                                                                                                                           
 333 Id. at 25–26 (noting that because “[p]olicies and interventions to lift people out of poverty may 
be differentially effective among different geographical locations, within communities of color, within 
rural environments, or among young people,” more complete data about the factors that contribute to 
poverty in these subpopulations are needed). When SOGI data is collected it is helpful in consequen-
tial ways. As an example, SOGI data collected in Massachusetts revealed that LGBT people in the 
state experienced sexual assault, binge drinking, tobacco use, and anxiety and depression at rates 
higher than non-LGBT people. See Baker & Hughes, supra note 249, at 4. Using these data, Massa-
chusetts was able to “better target these issues though direct services such as suicide prevention pro-
grams, domestic violence prevention and services, homeless services, meals for LGBT elders, and 
LGBT youth services.” Id. 
 334 DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND 
THE LIMITS OF LAW 141 (2011) (“We are used to filling out forms with certain questions. We rarely 
question how we came to be asked for those particular pieces of information and not others . . . .”). 
 335 See Pixler, supra note 32, at 1097; see also, e.g., SPADE, supra note 334, at 38 (“Administra-
tive systems often appear ‘neutral,’ especially when discrimination has been framed as a problem of 
individuals with bad intentions who need to be prohibited from their bad acts by law.”); Bhatnagar, 
supra note 9, at 85, 95 (“In attempting to square the idea of self-classification with the jurisprudence 
on the race-based classifications, it becomes clear that the government’s role in data collection goes 
far beyond neutral collection.”); Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential? An Interpretive Analysis of 
Proposition 209, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 39 n.211 (1999) (“For example, consider the United States 
census, a seemingly innocuous exercise of race conscious classification that no one would normally 
consider as granting preferential treatment. Yet, if one looks to effects, disparities nonetheless 
emerge.”). 
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1. Privacy and Confidentiality Concerns About Government Data 
Collection 
There is a normative question that underlies all of the foregoing discus-
sion about government data collection: should the government collect such 
data?336 Notwithstanding prohibitions on the dissemination of personal infor-
mation, collection of data raises concerns about privacy and confidentiality.337 
Those concerns raise the question of the proper balance between individual 
privacy rights and governmental need for the data.338 Some scholars have ar-
gued that the balance must be struck in favor of individual privacy rights and 
they contend that the questions asked in the ACS are wrong as a normative 
matter and prohibited as a legal matter.339 
The risk of governmental misuse of data, namely by breaching confiden-
tiality and privacy requirements, largely informs such arguments. For example, 
the Census Bureau planned to include a citizenship question on the 2020 Cen-
sus.340 The question—“Is this person a citizen of the United States?”—was 
challenged in court as violating the Census Clause of the Constitution and the 
APA.341 The challengers’ practical concerns included the potential for identify-
ing information to be used by government officials to advance its “massive 
dragnet for unauthorized immigrants.”342 Moreover, advocates for immigrants 
                                                                                                                           
 336 See Pixler, supra note 32, at 1120. 
 337 Pursuant to Title 13 of the U.S. Code, it is unlawful to publish any personal information, or for 
a government agency or court to use the information provided by respondents. See 13 U.S.C. § 9 
(2018). Census Bureau employees take a lifetime oath to protect the confidentiality of such infor-
mation and face a federal prison sentence of up to five years and/or a fine of up to $5,000 for violating 
that oath. Id. § 214. The privacy and confidentiality provisions in Title 13 mean that “the Census Bureau 
has one of the strongest confidentiality guarantees in the federal government.” Privacy & Confidentiality, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.Census.gov/history/www/reference/privacy_confidentiality/ 
[https://perma.cc/DQT5-G7MF]. 
 338 See Privacy & Confidentiality, supra note 337. The Census Bureau has enacted privacy and 
confidentiality measures to allay some of these concerns. Described as “data stewardship,” these 
measures include a statement of privacy principles, an online privacy policy, and a data protection 
policy. Moreover, the Census Bureau removes personally identifiable information from its data, re-
stricts the number of individuals authorized to access private information, and criminalizes a violation 
of the privacy policies with up to five years in federal prison and/or a $250,000 fine. See Data Protec-
tion and Privacy Program, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.Census.gov/about/policies/privacy/
data_stewardship/our_privacy_principles.html [https://perma.cc/VXK4-47SH]. 
 339 See Pixler, supra note 32, at 1119–22. 
 340 See Hansi Lo Wang, Judge Orders Trump Administration to Remove 2020 Census Citizenship 
Question, NPR (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/15/671283852/judge-orders-trump-
administration-to-remove-2020-Census-citizenship-question [https://perma.cc/PRY5-M8SE]. 
 341 See Complaint at 1, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 
(2019) (No. 1:18-cv-2921). 
 342 Vann R. Newkirk II, The Weaponized Census, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/the-weaponized-Census/556592/ [https://perma.cc/774H-
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also worried “about the potential unethical or extralegal power such data can 
lend to an anti-immigration regime,” notwithstanding that the Census Bureau 
is prohibited from sharing such identifying information.343 While a federal trial 
court ruled that the addition of the citizenship question violated the APA and 
thus may not be included in the 2020 Census,344 the litigation and widespread 
public outcry exemplifies the privacy and confidentiality concerns surrounding 
the Census.345 Finally, the LGBT community’s history of being targeted by law 
enforcement—from Stonewall to Bowers v. Hardwick and into the present—
renders privacy and confidentiality concerns particularly salient for the LGBT 
population.346 
2. The Differential Undercount 
Since its origin, the Census has undercounted the American population.347 
The undercount, however, is not proportional among racial and ethnic 
groups.348 Instead, a phenomenon known as the “differential undercount”—the 
                                                                                                                           
TZ5X] (stating that “[p]roviding data at the block level would allow ICE to locate unauthorized im-
migrants with greater ease”). 
 343 Id. (noting that “in times of American turmoil the Census Bureau has broken that mandate” 
and “in the past, not all ICE officials have proven scrupulous about data privacy”). 
 344 See Wang, supra note 340. The Trump Administration has asked the U.S. Supreme Court to 
consider the case. See Robert Barnes, Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Quickly Take Up 
Census Citizenship Question, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/trump-administration-asks-supreme-court-to-quickly-take-up-census-citizenship-question/
2019/01/22/93734014-1e73-11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html [https://perma.cc/XN6Y-6CY3]. 
Ultimately, the Trump Administration decided to withdraw the citizenship question from the 2020 
census. See generally Michael Wines, 2020 Census Won’t Have Citizenship Question as Trump Ad-
ministration Drops Effort, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/
trump-census-citizenship-question.html [https://perma.cc/R3YF-6FEA] (discussing the Administra-
tion’s decision to abandon the addition of the question despite having embarked on an extensive effort 
to add it). 
 345 See, e.g., Deborah Barfield Berry, Census Deadline Looms for Public to Comment on Adding 
Citizenship Question, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2018/08/07/citizenship-question-2020-census-stirs-protests-and-comments/924713002/ [https://perma.
cc/L2Q7-BKR3] (“The debate over adding the question has stirred protests and letter-writing cam-
paigns. It has also been the subject of congressional hearings, legislation and lawsuits.”). 
 346 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding anti-sodomy laws); Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 143 (highlight-
ing a history of bias from law enforcement toward the transgender community); Woods, supra note 10 
(discussing inequities for LGBT individuals within the criminal justice system). 
 347 See, e.g., Stansbury, supra note 30, at 408. 
 348 To be clear, this means that the number of literal bodies of people of color that are not counted 
at all is larger than the literal bodies of white people that are not counted at all. In other words, the 
differential undercount is not a situation in which people of color are counted but they are not identi-
fied as people of color, which would be another kind of identity undercount. It is that these people of 
color are not counted at all. See Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 281, at 666 (“The burden of being 
missed in the Census fell disproportionately on members of minority groups—Blacks, Hispanics, 
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disproportionate undercount of people of color in comparison to the under-
count of white people—has been traced back to at least 1940.349 The difference 
in the undercount between people of color and white people has ranged from a 
5.8% difference in 1950 to a 6.4% difference in 1990.350 This differential un-
dercount is most pronounced in urban centers.351 
Several causes of the differential undercount have been identified. First, 
living arrangements for people of color may be more nuanced than for their 
white counterparts, as people of color tend to have larger households and to 
move more often than white people.352 Second, people of color face structural 
educational disadvantages, including with their ability to be proficient in the 
English language, and thus may not have the skills necessary to complete the 
questionnaire.353 Third, people of color may perceive additional costs associat-
ed with the completion of the Census, such as eviction from overcrowded 
housing or the loss of welfare benefits.354 Finally, the undercount is also higher 
in heavily populated areas, particularly in inner cities, which often contain sig-
nificant minority populations.355 
The differential undercount is constitutionally and pragmatically prob-
lematic. The constitutional problem is grounded in the purpose of the Census 
itself, namely the constitutional mandate that the decennial Census be com-
pleted to apportion seats in Congress. Thus, “census figures are used to deter-
mine the distribution of political power in the institutions that comprise the 
heart of our democracy.”356 The differential undercount thus compromises the 
constitutional promise of “one person[,] one vote.”357 
Furthermore, states use Census data to draw political districts for both the 
federal House of Representatives and the state legislature, again threatening 
the “one person, one vote” principle when people of color are not counted.358 
When the literal bodies of people of color are not counted by the Census, they 
                                                                                                                           
Asian Americans, and American Indians.”). Anderson & Fienberg also note that “[t]he Census misses 
more minority, younger, and urban residents than it does majority, older, and suburban residents.” Id. 
at 669. 
 349 Stansbury, supra note 30, at 404, 409. 
 350 Id. at 409–10; see WILLIAMS, supra note 37. 
 351 Razi, supra note 9, at 1108. 
 352 Stansbury, supra note 30, at 410; see also Razi, supra note 9, at 1109. 
 353 Stansbury, supra note 30, at 410. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. 
 356 Razi, supra note 9, at 1102. 
 357 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority 
Representation: The Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13 
REV. LITIG. 1, 4 (1993) (discussing the importance of numerical standards in determining representa-
tion and in the background of the one person/one vote jurisprudence). 
 358 Razi, supra note 9, at 1103. 
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are also not counted for purposes of congressional apportionment, which in 
turn can result in the allocation of fewer congressional representatives in areas 
heavily populated by people of color. Moreover, if Census data is racially in-
complete, elected officials cannot accurately know who they represent and, as 
a result, cannot represent the interests of all their constituents in an informed 
way. A politician cannot adequately represent people without knowing his or 
her constituents.359 
Finally, on a programmatic level, the federal government uses Census da-
ta to allocate billions of dollars of funding for anti-poverty programs. This be-
gan in the 1960s when Congress established a grant-based system based on 
population sizes to appropriate federal money to state and local governments, 
including programs for “vocational education, highway construction, agricul-
tural extension, and public health.”360 The 1960s also saw the civil rights 
movement harness the differential undercount to argue for the amelioration of 
race-based discrimination.361 It used the undercount to argue that racial minori-
ties would be underrepresented, which would lead to employment discrimina-
tion, diminished community participation, and decreased access to housing.362 
Activists and attorneys used Census data to make these arguments, and Con-
gress responded with passage of civil rights laws, such as the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 that utilized Census data for enforcement.363 
The differential undercount means that the allocation of federal dollars to 
social safety net programs is racialized and discriminatory.364 It creates con-
crete inequities in the everyday lives of people of color living in poverty.365 A 
specific example of the differential undercount at work comes from Hartford, 
Connecticut: 
As the city with the sixth highest rate of undercount in the 1990 
Census, Hartford’s predominantly minority population was under-
counted by about 6,500 persons. The 6,500-person undercount has 
resulted in Hartford losing a seat in the state legislature and receiv-
ing approximately $5 million less each year from the federal gov-
ernment than it would if the city’s population was accurately count-
ed by the Census. That $5 million in federal aid would come in the 
form of homes for people with low incomes, child care centers, and 
                                                                                                                           
 359 See generally id. at 1110 (explaining that if individuals are not accurately counted, their repre-
sentatives cannot properly represent them). 
 360 Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 281, at 669. 
 361 Id. at 669–70. 
 362 Id. at 665–70. 
 363 Id. at 666–71. 
 364 Id. at 671–72; Razi, supra note 9, at 1102. 
 365 Razi, supra note 9, at 1110. 
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more social service programs that bring food to the elderly and 
counsel victims of domestic violence. Additionally, if Hartford’s true 
population is counted by the 2000 Census, state aid to the city will 
increase significantly. The fact that federal and state assistance of 
this kind is needed in Hartford—America’s eighth poorest city—is 
poignant and important.366 
In addition to these concrete harms, the persistence of the differential un-
dercount “can diminish the perception that the count is equitable to the entire 
population.”367 Moreover, because the differential undercount creates the cor-
rect perception that the Census is unfair to certain populations, the Census 
“cannot successfully fulfill its political functions of distributing political power 
and money.”368 
3. Government Data Collection as a Tool of Identity Construction and 
Distribution of Life Chances 
In addition to the privacy risks through misuse, data collection is criti-
cized because it serves as a mechanism for the government to construct both 
identities and status regimes.369 In the specific context of race data, scholars 
have critiqued the racial categories of the Census along several axes. One axis 
is in the constitutive power of the Census’s racial categories: by requiring re-
spondents to choose one of several racial categories, the Census is an arche-
typal example of the legal construction of race.370 
There is thus a substantial body of scholarship that vigorously and effec-
tively argues against government data collection because such data becomes a 
powerful tool for the state to create identities and then surveil and control those 
identities.371 When the government categorizes people, it can use those catego-
ries to target particular identities for surveillance, discipline, or mistreat-
ment.372 There is good reason for these critiques and concerns. Census data 
have been used for various surveillance and disciplinary purposes throughout 
history. For example, one scholar notes that “[w]ithin two days of the attack on 
                                                                                                                           
 366 Id. at 1110–11 (footnotes omitted). 
 367 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 9. 
 368 Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 281, at 665–66. 
 369 See Mezey, supra note 65, at 1702. 
 370 See, e.g., Bhatnagar, supra note 9, at 87; Mezey, supra note 65, at 1702–03. Another common 
criticism is that the racial categories are imperfect and incomplete, and that one’s “legal” identity as 
reflected by the Census categories may conflict with one’s personal identity. See, e.g., Julissa Reyno-
so, Race, Censuses, and Attempts at Racial Democracy, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 533, 536 
(2001). 
 371 See, e.g., Mezey, supra note 65, at 1702; Razi, supra note 9, at 744–45. 
 372 Razi, supra note 9, at 744–45; see also Mezey, supra note 65, at 1715–18. 
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Pearl Harbor and before the United States declared war, the Census Bureau 
began locating Japanese Americans with the same IBM tabulating machines 
that Hitler was simultaneously using in Germany.”373 Eventually, almost 
112,000 Japanese Americans were rounded up and interned by using Census 
data.374 Such scholars are rightly concerned about the potential discriminatory 
use of Census data given this history. 
Seen through this lens of the Census as a “state apparatus,” the Census “is 
not just legal by virtue of its constitutional and statutory origins, but in the way 
it generates and enforces cultural norms, race-based rights and disabilities, and 
the boundaries of identity.”375 The same might be argued about LGBT-based 
rights and disabilities if the Census and ACS were to begin collecting and us-
ing SOGI data as it does race data. 
These critiques build on the work of Michel Foucault and propose that 
state-created categories become a mechanism for state control of identity 
through surveillance and discipline.376 In Foucaultian terms, the Census 
“makes each person seen and known by an invisible bureaucracy; each person 
becomes an object of observation, a subject of surveillance.”377 The Foucaulti-
an analysis also asserts that once the state controls the creation of identity cat-
egories, it then uses those categories to exclude some identity categories while 
officially recognizing and providing resources to others.378 
Professor Spade conceptualizes and describes the result of governmental 
construction of identities as “administrative systems that govern the distribu-
tion of life chances.”379 Put another way, state creation of identity categories 
through the Census and ACS enables the distributive functions of the adminis-
trative state: “[A]dministrative systems that classify people actually invent and 
produce meaning for the categories they administer, and . . . those categories 
manage both the population and the distribution of security and vulnerabil-
                                                                                                                           
 373 Pixler, supra note 32, at 1123. 
 374 Id. at 1124. 
 375 See Mezey, supra note 65, at 1703. Considered in this way, the Census may be further de-
scribed “as a technology of affirmative and disciplinary power employed by the bureaucratic state.” 
Id. at 1706. 
 376 See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 139–43 (Robert Hurley trans., Pan-
theon Books 1978), http://home.ku.edu.tr/~mbaker/CSHS503/FoucaultHistorySex.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R8GX-QQJ4].  
 377 See Mezey, supra note 65, at 1719. 
 378 See Bhatnagar, supra note 9, at 87 (“The [C]ensus is alleged to have enabled the exclusion and 
social control of groups, such as Native Americans and Chinese immigrants, while serving as a medi-
um of expression and official recognition for other groups, including Hispanics and multiracial indi-
viduals. These simultaneously exclusionary and affirming powers have rendered the [C]ensus the site 
of much political contest.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 379 SPADE, supra note 334, at 11. 
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ity.”380 The Census and ACS are “population-level interventions” that depend 
on state-created identity categories.381 The state then uses its categories to sort 
the population and then dole out financial resources to certain identity catego-
ries. These resources take the form of government social safety net “care tak-
ing programs” that are tailored to certain demographic populations: anti-
poverty programs for food and housing assistance, public health programs, 
preschool assistance for children living in poverty, job-training programs, and 
the like.382 Identity categories that qualify for and receive such resources be-
come an “in” group, while those identity categories that are not within the 
reach of such care-taking programs are constructed as the “outside” group.383 
As a result, “population-level care-taking programs always include population 
surveillance as a core function of their work.”384 
* * * 
Each of the foregoing critiques is well-founded and deserving of contin-
ued engagement and interrogation. This Article, while accepting such critiques 
as valid and important, nonetheless recommends the collection of SOGI data. 
While perhaps unidealistic, it is also a pragmatic recommendation. 
It is a way for the LGBT population to seek “recognition of a group iden-
tity and inclusion in the national community.”385 The Article accepts the Fou-
caultian and Spadeian critique that government data collection engages in the 
construction of identity for the most pragmatic of reasons: if the government is 
in the business of creating identity through data collection, and distributing life 
chances through those categorical identities, LGBT people should be a part of 
that regime. While critics articulate reasons that it is far from perfect, the gov-
ernment construction of identity and the distribution of resources to which it is 
tied is the ongoing reality of living in a neoliberal America.386 As such, LGBT 
Americans should be among the identity categories to which life chances are 
distributed. 
In short, the Article’s recommendation is the result of a weighted analysis. 
That weighted analysis considers the well-founded critiques—ones likely to be 
                                                                                                                           
 380 Id. at 32. 
 381 See id. at 138–39. 
 382 See generally id. at 139. 
 383 Id. 
 384 Id. at 140. Spade notes that “[s]tandardized, categorical data collection is essential to the crea-
tion of these programs because it allows governments, institutions, and agencies (U.S. Census Bureau 
. . .) to have a general picture of the population: its health, vulnerabilities, needs, and risks. Important-
ly, it is this way of thinking about population that allows such programs to exist at all.” Id. 
 385 See Mezey, supra note 65, at 1705, 1713–15. 
 386 See generally ADLER, supra note 124, at 111–12 (discussing the bipartisan efforts of neoliber-
alism and how the argument for gay marriage contributes to the neoliberal idea that society can rely 
on the private sector instead of requiring a social welfare state). 
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transformative if operationalized against government data collection—but 
nonetheless advocates for the inclusion of LGBT people into a flawed system 
of government data collection. It is a sanguine recommendation that recognizes 
and appreciates that the beneficial work accomplished through government 
data collection is never fully severable from the work that government data do 
to control and discipline.387 
CONCLUSION 
Where data are tied to resource allocation, the Identity Undercount results 
in resource deserts and LGBT people do not get the critical and necessary ben-
efits and services. The government’s current near-complete failure to collect 
SOGI data makes the state an active participant in creating and sustaining in-
stitutionalized poverty for LGBT people, as well as continues the political 
marginalization of LGBT people. 
This Article contends that LGBT rights advocates should embrace an anti-
poverty agenda for the movement and insist that the state collect such data and 
use it to create anti-poverty programs for the LGBT community. Moreover, 
these advocates should harness such data to increase the political power for the 
LGBT community because the Census “does more than facilitate a body count; 
it also tells us whose body counts, and for how much.”388 
There is, of course, future work to do surrounding the issue of govern-
ment data collection beyond the first step of securing its collection. For exam-
ple, inquiry into the lessons learned from the Identity Undercount will be im-
portant for the larger projects of antidiscrimination and equality. Moreover, 
connecting the Identity Undercount to ongoing discussions about the use of 
data in government oversight and discrimination more broadly is another im-
portant aspect for future inquiry and consideration. This Article’s conceptual-
ization of the Identity Undercount is thus a jumping-off point for such future 
work, all of which is pointed toward securing economic justice, political agen-
cy, and equality for all LGBT Americans. 
                                                                                                                           
 387 See Mezey, supra note 65, at 1705 (“But these seemingly contradictory impulses of the Cen-
sus are always entangled as part of the project and power of enumeration. Identity recognition is also 
identity production and discipline in the sense that every act of recognition entails other categorical 
erasures, elisions, and enforcements.”). 
 388 See id. 
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APPENDIX A 
The 2020 Census will ask the following questions: 
• Age389 




• Tenure, which means how the respondent occupies his or her residence394 
• Operational questions395 




• Commuting (journey to work) 
• Computer and internet use 
• Disability 
                                                                                                                           
 389 See CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS PLANNED, supra note 73, at 5. 
 390 See id. at 9. There are five options to respond to this question: (1) No, not of Hispanic, Latino, 
or Spanish origin; (2) Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano; (3) Yes, Puerto Rican; (4) Yes, Cuban; 
and (5) Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, with a box to print the specific type. Id. 
 391 Id. at 11. There are fifteen options to respond to this question: (1) White; (2) Black or African 
American; (3) American Indian or Alaska Native; (4) Chinese; (5) Filipino; (6) Asian Indian; (7) Vi-
etnamese; (8) Korean; (9) Japanese; (10) Native Hawaiian; (11) Samoan; (12) Chamorro; (13) Other 
Asian, with a box to write in a description; (14) Other Pacific Islander, with a box to write in a de-
scription; and (15) Some other race, with a box to write in a description. Id. 
 392 See id. at 13. There are sixteen options to respond to this question: (1) Opposite-sex hus-
band/wife/spouse; (2) Opposite-sex unmarried partner; (3) Same-sex husband/wife/spouse; (4) Same-
sex unmarried partner; (5) Biological son or daughter; (6) Adopted son or daughter; (7) Stepson or 
stepdaughter; (8) Brother or sister; (9) Father or mother; (10) Grandchild; (11) Parent-in-law; (12) 
Son-in-law or daughter-in-law; (13) Other relative; (14) Roommate or housemate; (15) Foster child; 
and (16) Other nonrelative. Id. These data are used to plan and fund government programs that pro-
vide services and funding for families, to assess whether a community’s housing is meeting the needs 
of its residents, as well as to assist communities to enroll eligible families with children in programs 
such as Head Start. Id. 
 393 Id. at 15. There are two options to answer this question: Male and Female. Id. 
 394 Id. at 17. There are four options to answer this question: (1) Owned by you or someone in this 
household with a mortgage or loan; (2) Owned by you or someone in this household free and clear; 
(3) Rented; and (4) Occupied without payment of rent. Id. 
 395 These questions include the number of people living in the house, apartment, or mobile home 
on “Census day” (April 1, 2020), the telephone number of the respondent, and requesting a list of each 
person living in the residence, with “Person 1” defined as the person living at the residence who owns 
it or pays rent. If the person who owns the residence or pays its rent does not live there, then any adult 
living there may be listed as “Person 1.” Id. at 19. 
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• Fertility 
• Grandparent caregivers 
• Health insurance 
• Hispanic origin 
• Home heating fuel 
• Home value and rent 
• Income 
• Industry, occupation, and class of worker 
• Labor force status 
• Language spoken at home 
• Marital status and marital history 
• Migration 
• Place of birth, citizenship, and year of entry 
• Plumbing facilities, kitchen facilities, and telephone service 
• Race 
• Relationship 
• School enrollment, educational attainment, and undergraduate field of 
degree 
• Selected monthly owner costs (cost of utilities, condominium and mobile 
home fees, taxes, insurance, and mortgages) 
• Sex 
• SNAP/food stamps 
• Tenure 
• Units in structure, rooms, and bedrooms 
• Vehicles available 
• Veteran status, period of service, and department of veteran’s affairs ser-
vice-connected disability rating 
• Work status last year 
• Year built and moved in 
• Operational questions396 
 
                                                                                                                           
 396 See CENSUS BUREAU, SUBJECTS PLANNED, supra note 41, at 7–70; see also CENSUS BUREAU, 
QUESTIONS PLANNED, supra note 73, at 23–87. 
  
 
